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INTRODUCTION 
 
Usage of smartphones and other smart devices has become common in our everyday lives. 
What makes such devices ‘smart’ is the fact that a major part of the user experience is based 
on the use of software applications. A multitude of different applications or ‘apps’ are 
available for various purposes and all of them operate on the basis of processing certain type 
of information or ‘data’. Such data might either be inserted by the users, or collected via 
different monitoring devices transferring the data to the apps.  
 
One specific category of apps consists of those used for health and medical purposes. Some 
health apps are rather simple and used for storing and analysing information which the user of 
the app provides, for example an app that makes it easy to keep track of the health parameters 
the user inserts. Other apps are connected with different technical devices, often called 
wearable devices, which use sensors in order to monitor the person’s health parameters in real 
time and precise manner. These include, for example, a smartphone with an internal 
pedometer to track the steps taken during a day, or a specific device that is able to meter the 
glycose level of a diabetic. All these apps and devices form a part of the conception of mobile 
health or ‘mHealth’. 
 
mHealth is a sub-segment of eHealth and covers medical and public health practice supported 
by mobile devices. It includes the use of mobile devices for health and well-being services 
and information purposes as well as mobile health applications.1 Predictions suggest that by 
2017, 50% of all smartphone and tablet users will have accessed an mHealth application and 
the number of available mHealth applications will be approaching 1 million, with 62 different 
app stores functioning as software distributors.2 
 
One of the key elements of mHealth is its potential to allow the establishment of treatment 
relationships between a patient and a physician who are not dependent on the geographical 
location.3 However, this concept falls rather under the notion of telemedicine4 and the issues 
                                                 
1 mHealth – Digital Single Market. European Commission. - https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/mhealth (28.04.2016). 
2 Mobile health app market report 2013–2017: The commercialization of mHealth. Research2Guidance. - http://
www.researchandmarkets.com/reports/2497392/mobile_health_app_market_report_20132017 (5.02.2016), p 15. 
3 E. Mantovani, P. Quinn. mHealth and data protection – the letter and the spirit of consent legal requirements. - 
International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 2014, 28:2, 222-236, p 222. 
4 Telemedicine is the use of medical information exchanged from one site to another via electronic 
communications to improve a patient’s clinical health status. See: What is telemedicine? – American 
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regarding that kind of treatment relationship will not be analysed in this thesis. This thesis 
will focus on another aspect of mHealth, which concerns a situation when an enormous 
amount of data is collected through the apps. The collection and processing of data from the 
users of the apps have its benefits. By having a constant access to one’s own health data, the 
individuals are more empowered to keep track of their health status. In addition, combing the 
data collected through the apps could lead to new discoveries regarding diseases and health 
management could be made which would benefit the whole society.  
 
Despite the advantages of using mobile devices for health monitoring, there are also several 
risks and problems. Large part of the data that are processed in the apps falls under the notion 
of personal data. Processing personal data triggers the applicability of the data protection rules 
in order to protect the persons’ right to privacy. The risks arising with the use of mHealth 
regarding the data protection will be the main focus in this thesis. 
 
In Estonia, data protection is regulated on national level under the Personal Data Protection 
Act5. Nevertheless, for the purposes of more extensive analysis and practical use, the 
regulative base for this thesis shall be the law of the European Union. Over half the countries 
in the world have a data protection law and most are strongly influenced by the European 
approach.6 The right of protection of personal data is a fundamental right under Art 8 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.7 However, already before the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was adopted, the right for protection of 
personal data could be derived from Art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.8 At 
the EU level, the need for separate data protection act arose during the 1990s. Free movement 
of goods, capital, services and people within the internal market required the free flow of data, 
which could not have been realised unless the member states could rely on a uniform high 
level of data protection.9 Therefore, the Data Protection Directive10 (hereinafter DPD) was 
                                                                                                                                                        
Telemedicine Association. - (http://www.americantelemed.org/about-telemedicine/what-is-
telemedicine#.VyUgylaLRmM) (28.04.2016).  
5 Personal Data Protection Act. - RT I 2007, 24, 127 
6 G. Buttarelli. The EU GDPR as a clarion call for a new global digital gold standard. – International Data 
Privacy Law, Guest Editorial. - http://www.oxfordjournals.org/our_journals/idpl/featured.html (28.04.2016) 
7 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. - OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 391–407. 
8 European Convention on Human Rights (entry into force 4.11.1950). - 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf  
9 Handbook on European Data Protection Law. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014, 
p 17.  
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adopted in 1996 and is still in force. The DPD became an international standard of data 
protection by introducing common legal principles and concepts, such as individual control 
rights, purpose limitation principle, data quality and legitimacy of data processing.11  
 
However, since 2010 the need for reform in the field of the personal data protection in the EU 
has been brought up. To start with, the member states have failed to implement the DPD into 
their national laws in uniform manner.12 Furthermore, there was a legal uncertainty 
concerning how to deal with the significant risks associated with online activity.13 
Subsequently, in January 2012, the European Commission put forward the EU Data 
Protection Reform.14 On 14 April, 2016, after prolonged negotiations, the European 
Parliament adopted two new sets of data protection rules: the General Data Protection 
Regulation15 (hereinafter GDPR) and the Data Protection Directive for the police and criminal 
justice sector16. 
 
This thesis will analyse if and how the EU current and future data protection framework 
applies to the field of mHealth. While the usage of mHealth is increasing and the persons are 
willing to disclose more personal information to the apps, it is crucial to make sure that data 
                                                                                                                                                        
10 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 281, 
23.11.1995, p 31–50. 
11 C. Cuijpers, N. Purtova, E. Kosta. Data Protection Reform and the Internet: the draft Data Protection 
Regulation. - Tilburg Law School Research Paper 2014, No. 3. - http://ssrn.com/abstract=2373683 (05.04.2014), 
p 1. 
12 For example, see: CJEU 16.10.2012, C-614/10, Commission vs Austria. 
13 W. Kotschy. The proposal for a new General Data Protection Regulation - problems solved? - International 
Data Privacy Law, 2014, Vol. 4, No. 4, p 274-281, p 274. 
14 Commission proposes a comprehensive reform of data protection rules to increase users' control of their data 
and to cut costs for businesses. - European Commission Press Release. Brussels, 25 January 2012.-  
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-46_en.htm?locale=en (17.04.2016). 
15 The official text of the General Data Protection Regulation has not yet been published in the Official Journal 
of the European Union at the time of submitting this thesis. Before the voting in the European Parliament, the 
Council of European Union published a final text of the GDPR on 6 April 2016. All the references to the GDPR 
in this thesis are made to named text. See: Position of the Council at first reading with a view to the adoption of a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General 
Data Protection Regulation). ST 5419 2016 INIT - 2012/011 (OLP). Brussel, 6 April 2016. - http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CONSIL:ST_5419_2016_INIT&from=EN (1.05.2016). 
16 Position of the Council at first reading with a view to the adoption of a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by 
competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. ST 5418 2016 INIT - 2012/010 (OLP). Brussels, 6 April 2016. - http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CONSIL:ST_5418_2016_INIT&qid=1462066004286&from=EN (1.05.2016). 
 7 
protection rules are followed applied unambiguously. The hypothesis of this thesis states that 
the current data protection framework is not suitable to apply to modern day realities like 
mHealth. Although, the new GDPR is already adopted, the author of this thesis is in the 
opinion that the GDPR will not improve the situation regarding the data protection in 
mHealth. Therefore, the central thesis question is whether the current EU data protection 
framework is sufficient in order to protect the personal data in the field of mHealth. As a new 
framework will be in force in two years, the thesis will also examine whether the GDPR will 
bring any changes to data protection regarding mHealth. Deriving from the central question, 
the thesis has been divided into three chapters. 
 
The first chapter gives an overview of the concept of mHealth in relation to relevant data 
protection terms. In order to understand how data protection rules apply in the field of 
mHealth, it must be clarified how the realities of mHealth are transposed under the data 
protection rules. It will be described what kind of data is considered as personal data and what 
is considered as health data. As the classification of mHealth apps or devices under the notion 
of medical devices might change the applicability of data protection rules, it will be analysed, 
whether the apps and devices of mHealth could be considered as medical devices. Therefore, 
the main question of first chapter is whether the data protection terms are suitable in order to 
apply these to the realities of mHealth. 
 
In the second chapter, the underlying concepts and principles of data protection will be 
brought out and analysed in the light of mHealth. In the first part, the notion of consent will 
be described and the possible problems of obtaining consent for processing of personal data 
will be brought out. In the second part, two of the data protection principles will be chosen – 
purpose limitation principle and data minimisation principle – and shown if and how the 
applying of those principles affects mHealth. The main question of the second chapter is 
whether the traditional data protection requirements are sufficient and clear enough in order to 
apply them for the protection of personal data in mHealth.  
 
In the third chapter, it will be discussed if and how it is lawful to further use the health data 
collected in mHealth without the consent of the data subject. If such processing turns out to be 
lawful, it could seriously harm the persons’ right to privacy and undermine their trust in 
mHealth solutions. The notion of big data will be explained and found whether the data 
protection principles should apply to big data processing. Then it will be analysed whether big 
data processing can be concluded without the consent of the data subject by applying the 
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exceptions on further use. The main question of the third chapter is whether and on what 
conditions the further use of health data is possible without the user’s consent.  
 
In order to answer to the raised questions, the author has used comparative and analytical 
methods. The analytical method is used to analyse the application of data protection 
regulations to the concepts of mHealth. The comparative method is used to compare the 
requirement of DPD and GDPR. Both methods are used throughout the thesis.  
 
In the course of writing the thesis, the author has used the DPD and the GDPR in order to 
analyse the applicability and comparison of the rules of these laws. To understand the content 
behind the personal data protection rules, many opinion papers from the Article 29 Working 
Party17 (hereinafter the Working Party) have been used, since the Working Party is considered 
the authority in the European data protection sphere. Moreover, several other opinions on 
mHealth by different data protection supervisory authorities have been used. As the field of 
mHealth, and especially the data protection issues relating to it are rather new, academic 
literature on this topic is relatively limited. However, several identified articles proved useful 
where the principles of data protection were analysed in the context of mHealth. Some of the 
standpoints from the articles were contested, while some were used to support the arguments 
of the author of this thesis.  
 
The keywords taken from the Estonian Subject Thesaurus characterising this thesis are: 
- Data protection 
- Personal data 
- Privacy 
- Health data 
- Information Technology 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
17 Article 29 Working Party is the advisory body set up under the Data Protection Directive who issues opinions 
and recommendation on topics related to personal data protection.  
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1. THE CONCEPT OF mHEALTH 
 
1.1 Introduction to Chapter 
 
In order to understand how the data protection rules apply to field of mHealth, firstly, the 
relevant terms must be made described. The definition of personal data is described in order 
to move to the special categories of data which enjoy special protection under the data 
protection rules.  
 
The definition of health data in mHealth apps is more complex as the apps collect various 
kinds of data which could in combination be considered as health data. The differentiation 
between regular personal data and health data is extremely important as the breaches 
concerning health data endanger the person’s right to privacy in much more substantial way. 
It will be brought out what are the criterion for deciding whether the mHealth data could be 
considered health data.  
 
In addition to different terms and notions of data protection, the definition of medical devices 
is also analysed. Although the medical devices might seem to be far from the regulation of 
data protection, actually the determination that an app or a wearable device could be 
considered as a medical device under the special directive, could change the applicability of 
the data protection rules to processing.  
 
1.2 Health Data 
 
1.2.1 Definition of Personal Data 
 
Pursuant to Article 2 (a) of the DPD, personal data is defined as information relating to an 
identified or an identifiable natural person. An identifiable person is one who can be 
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to 
one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or 
social identity. Working Party has analysed the concept of personal data in its Opinion 
4/2007.18 According to the Working Party, the definition of personal data in Art 2 (a) of the 
DPD contains four main building blocks: ‘any information’, ‘relating to’, ‘an identified or/and 
                                                 
18 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, adopted on 20th June, WP136.  
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identifiable’ and ‘natural person’.19 These four main elements will be described in more detail 
on the basis of the Working Party’s opinion. In order to understand how these elements 
should be applied in practice when assessing whether data is considered as personal data, an 
example will be used. The example set of data is data, which consists of a number of steps 
taken by a person during one day collected through a specific app20 on a smartphone.  
 
The first element, term ‘any information’, refers to the wide interpretation and broad concept 
of personal data. The nature of the information can be either objective (fact about a certain 
person) or subjective (opinions or assessments). The content of the information can be any 
sort of information. The term ‘personal data’ includes information concerning the individual’s 
private and family life, but also information about the types of activities undertaken by the 
individual.21 Considering the format or the medium on which that information is contained, 
the concept of personal data includes information available in whichever form, be it 
alphabetical, numerical, graphical, photographical or acoustic.22 The example of the number 
of steps fulfils this condition, as it shows the activity of a person. Therefore, even a number 
on an app, which at first sight might seem to have no value, could be considered as personal 
data.  
 
The second element is ‘relating to’ which is important to precisely identify and distinguish the 
relations/links that matter. In general terms, information can be considered to ‘relate’ to an 
individual when it is about that individual.23 Information relates to an individual if it refers to 
the identity, characteristics or behaviour of an individual or if such information is used to 
determine or influence the way in which that person is treated or evaluated.24 The example of 
the number of steps fulfils this condition if it is possible to relate the number of steps to a 
specific person, for example, if only one person has held the smartphone throughout the 
specific day. The link between the data subject and the data must exist, which in case of 
mobile apps is relatively easy to identify because apps are usually used to collect information 
about oneselves.  
                                                 
19 Working Party, Opinion 4/2007, p 6. 
20 The author of this thesis does not use as an example a specific existing app, but rather the idea of such app. 
However, many apps with the same purpose are available in the market.   
21 Working Party, Opinion 4/2007, p 6. 
22 Ibid, p 7. 
23 Ibid, p 9.  
24 Article 29 Working Party. Working Document on data protection issues related to RFID technology, adopted 
on 19.1.2005, p 8. 
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The third element is ‘identified or identifiable’. In general terms, a natural person can be 
considered as ‘identified’ when, within a group of persons, he or she is ‘distinguished’ from 
all other members of the group. Accordingly, the natural person is ‘identifiable’ when, 
although the person has not been identified yet, it is possible to do it.25 Taken the example of 
the number of steps, this means that it must be possible to determine the person whose steps 
have been counted. If the app on the same device has been used by several persons and it is 
not possible to determine whose steps were counted, it cannot be considered as personal data. 
 
The fourth element is ‘natural person’ meaning that the protection applies to human beings. 
The right to the protection of personal data is, in that sense, a universal one that is not 
restricted to nationals or residents in a certain country.26 Recital 2 of the DPD explicitly 
makes this point by stating that ‘data processing systems are designed to serve man’ and that 
they ‘must, whatever the nationality or residence of natural persons, respect their fundamental 
rights and freedoms’. Here, the example of number of steps does not even raise a question 
whether it is about a natural person, because the collecting activity and the nature of the data 
exclude the possibility that the data concerns a judicial person. 
 
In some cases, the data which initially had the characteristics of personal data is no longer 
considered as personal data. This is called anonymised data, which has been explained in 
Recital 26 of the DPD. Data are anonymised if all identifying elements have been eliminated 
from a set of personal data. No element may be left in the information which could, by 
exercising reasonable effort, serve to re-identify the person(s) concerned. Where data have 
been successfully anonymised, they are no longer considered as personal data and the 
principles and requirements of DPD do not apply to the processing of such data.27  
 
In the GDPR, the definition of personal data still includes the same four main elements. 
However, personal data is defined in a slightly more precise manner and adds name, location 
data, online identifier and also genetic information as potential identifiers of a person.28 The 
                                                 
25 Working Party, Opinion 4/2007, p 12. 
26 Ibid, p 21. 
27 Handbook on European Data Protection Law, p 44. 
28 GDPR, Art 4(1): ’personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person 
'data subject'; an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference 
to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, online identifier or to one or more factors 
specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that person; 
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reason for this, as acknowledged by the Working Party29 and increasingly emphasized by 
scholars30, is that all data could potentially be personal data. Data, which at one moment in 
time may contain no information about a specific person whatsoever, may in the future be 
used, through advanced techniques, to identify or individualise a person.31 Moreover, data that 
may not alone identify a person can increasingly be linked, among other means through 
interconnecting and harvesting databases, and be used to create profiles so that two or more 
non-identifying datasets may become identifying datasets if integrated.32  
 
The GDPR continues to state that the anonymised data is not considered as personal data and 
the principles of data protection should therefore not apply to anonymous information. That is 
information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or to data 
rendered anonymous in such a way that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable. 
Therefore, the GDPR does not concern the processing of such anonymous information, 
including for statistical and research purposes.33  
 
After Working Party’s suggestion34, the concept of pseudonymisation was introduced to the 
GDPR. Art 4 (3) (b) defines pseudonymisation as the processing of personal data in such a 
way that the data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of 
additional information, as long as such additional information is kept separately and subject to 
technical and organisational measures to ensure non-attribution to an identified or identifiable 
person. In practice, data is pseudonymised when the identifiers (name, date of birth etc) in the 
personal information are replaced by one pseudonym, which is achieved, for example, by 
encryption or hashing of those identifiers.35  
 
In contrast to anonymised data, pseudonymised data is still considered personal data 
according to Recital 23 of GDPR. The pseudonymisation of data by data processors and 
controllers is encouraged in the GDPR, as it gives them several benefits. For example, the 
                                                 
29 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Technique, adopted on 10 April 2014, WP216, 
p 9.  
30 For full reference see: B. Van der Sloot. Do data protection rules protect the individual and should they? An 
assessment of the proposed General Data Protection Regulation. - International Data Privacy Law, 2014, Vol. 4, 
No. 4, p 309, fn 22. 
31 Van der Sloot, p 309.  
32 M. R. Koot, Measuring and Predicting Anonymity, Amsterdam: Informatics Institute cop., 2012, p 101. 
33 GDPR, Recital 23.  
34 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 01/2012 on the data protection reform proposals, adopted on 23 March 
2012, 00530/12/EN WP 191, p 11 
35 Handbook on European Data Protection Law, p 45.  
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data breach notification requirements are mitigated (Art 32 (3) (a) of the GDPR) and there is 
greater flexibility to conduct data profiling without data subject’s consent (Art 20 (1a) (b) of 
the GDPR). However, Working Party has expressed the opinion that pseudonymised data 
should not be defined as a new category of data, allowing for derogations from certain 
obligations defined under the GDPR.36 The GDPR also encourages pseudonymisation in the 
interests of enhancing security and as a privacy by design measure (Recital 61 of the GDPR), 
which is also supported by the Working Party.37  
 
1.2.2 Special Protection of Sensitive Data 
 
Some forms of personal data are considered to be of a particular sensitive nature requiring 
stricter protection.38 Art 8 (1) of the DPD lists such data as revealing racial or ethnic origin, 
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the 
processing of data concerning health or sex life. In Recital 33 of the DPD these data are 
referred to as data which are capable by their nature of infringing fundamental freedoms or 
privacy. Therefore, these forms of data are more strictly protected and in general processing 
of such data is prohibited, except for certain cases as stipulated in Art 8. 
 
The rationale behind regulating particular categories of data in a different way stems from the 
presumption that misuse of these data could have more severe consequences on the 
individual’s fundamental rights, such as the right to privacy and non-discrimination, than 
misuse of other, ‘normal’ personal data. Misuse of sensitive data, such as health data or sexual 
orientation (e.g. if publicly revealed), may be irreversible and have long-term consequences 
for the individual as well as his social environment.39 The European Court of Human Rights40 
                                                 
36 Article 29 Working Party, Letter to Mr Jan Philipp ALBRECHT, 17 June 2015. - 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/other-
document/files/2015/20150617_letter_from_the_art29_wp_on_trilogue_to_mralbrecht_en.pdf (18 March 2016); 
Article 29 Working Party, Letter to Mr Jan Philipp ALBRECHT, Appendix, 17 June 2015. -  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/other-
document/files/2015/20150617_appendix_core_issues_plenary_en.pdf (18 March 2016). 
37 Article 29 Working Party, Letter to Mr Jan Philipp ALBRECHT. 
38 The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Commentary. Hart Publishing: Oxford, p 253. 
39 Article 29 Working Party Advice Paper on Special Categories of Data (sensitive data). -  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/other-
document/files/2011/2011_04_20_letter_artwp_mme_le_bail_directive_9546ec_annex1_en.pdf (20.02.2016), p 
4. 
40 The European Court of Human Rights is established by the European Convention of Human Rights, a human 
rights instrument drafted by the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe has adopted its own regulation for the 
protection of personal data – Convention for the protection of individuals with regard to the automatic 
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has also confirmed the special nature of such sensitive data: ‘the protection of personal data, 
in particular medical data, is of fundamental importance to a person’s enjoyment of his or her 
right to respect for private and family life’.41 
 
1.2.3 The Definition of Health Data 
 
In 2011, the Working Party issued an advice paper on special categories of data, where it 
acknowledged that health data represents one of the most complex categories of sensitive data 
due to the wide range of personal data that may fall into the category of health-related data.42 
However, despite providing high level of protection for health data, the DPD does not define 
what is meant under the term ‘health data’. In order to apply the special protection to health 
data, it must be understood when the data can be considered as health data.  
 
Until now, it has been left to the courts and data protection agencies to decide on a case-by-
case basis whether data constitute health data. For example, the European Court of Justice 
found in the Lindqvist case that the fact that an individual has injured her foot and is on half-
time on medical grounds constitutes personal data concerning health within the meaning of 
Article 8 (1) of the Data Protection Directive.43 Some other examples from national 
legislators, judges and data protection agencies when data have constituted as health data 
include: a fact that a person is wearing glasses or contact lenses; data about a person's 
intellectual and emotional capacity (such as IQ), information about smoking and drinking 
habits; data on allergies disclosed to private entities (such as airlines) or to public bodies 
(such as schools); data on health conditions to be used in an emergency (for example 
information that a child taking part in a summer camp or similar event suffers from asthma); 
membership of an individual in a patient support group (e.g. cancer support group), Weight 
Watchers, Alcoholics Anonymous or other self-help and support groups with a health-related 
objective.44  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
processing of personal data (Convention 108). See: Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Council of Europe, CETS No. 108, 1981.  
As the Convention 108 uses the same language while defining personal data and special categories of personal 
data, the judgment of ECtHR can be applied to interpret the DPD.  
41 ECtHR, I v Finland, No. 20511/03, 17 July 2008. 
42 Article 29 Working Party Advice Paper on Special Categories of Data (sensitive data), p. 10. 
43 European Court of Justice, Judgment of 6 November 2003, Case C-101/01 - Bodil Lindqvist. 
44 Working Party, Annex, p 6. 
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A case-by-case analysis of data might have been sufficient means to determine the health data 
at the time when the processing of such data mostly concerned the relation between 
physicians and data subject, and in some cases also the employer and the data subject. 
However, since the emergence of the internet, technological developments have given 
everyone the chance to collect and process different personal data and a large proportion of it 
might fall under the notion of health data. Therefore, in order for the app developers to 
comply with the regulations concerning processing health data, and also the data subjects to 
protect their rights, there should be a more precise meaning of the term ‘health data’.  
 
In 2015, the Working Party issued a document analysing the meaning of health data in apps 
and devices.45 They found that there is one category of information that can be uniformly 
found as health data, that is, medical data – a category of data about the physical or mental 
health status of a data subject that are generated in a professional, medical context. This 
includes all data related to contacts with individuals and their diagnosis and/or treatment by 
providers of health services, and any related information on diseases, disabilities, medical 
history and clinical treatment. This also includes any data generated by devices or apps, which 
are used in this context, irrespective of whether the devices are considered as ‘medical 
devices’. 
 
However, in addition to medical data, all data concerning the health of individual subjects can 
fall under the notion of health data. Furthermore, data used in administrative context (e.g. data 
disclosed to public authorities about disabilities or specific diseases for tax allowances or 
data; documents related to the health of the employee in the employment relationship)46 and 
also data about the purchase of medical products, devices and services constitute health 
data.47 The collected data does not need to establish ‘ill health’, for example, when a person 
fills in an online questionnaire with the purpose of providing health advice, the collected data 
are considered as health data regardless of the input the person provides.48 
 
                                                 
45 Article 29 Working Party, Annex (Health data in apps and devices) to a Letter to European Commission in 
answer to Green Paper, 05.02.2015. - http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/other-
document/files/2015/20150205_letter_art29wp_ec_health_data_after_plenary_annex_en.pdf (20.02.2016), p 2.  
46 EDPS Guidelines concerning the processing of health data in the workplace by Community institutions and 
bodies, September 2009, p. 2.  
47 Working Party, Annex, p 2.  
48 Ibid, p 2.  
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The absence of definition of health data has resulted in a situation where it is difficult for both 
the processors and controllers, but also the data subjects to understand whether the data in 
question could be processed at all and how it should be protected. In order to clarify this 
issue, the latest version of the proposed GDPR includes a definition of health data. Art 4 (1) 
(15) states that ‘data concerning health’ means personal data related to the physical or mental 
health of an individual, including the provision of health care services, which reveal 
information about his or her health status. 
 
In addition, the GDPR also includes a comprehensive, but non-exhaustive list in Recital 26 
about the meaning of health data. It reads that ‘personal data concerning health should include 
all data pertaining to the health status of a data subject which reveal information relating to 
the past, current or future physical or mental health status of the data subject; including 
information about the individual collected in the course of the registration for and the 
provision of health care services as referred to in Directive 2011/24/EU to the individual; a 
number, symbol or particular assigned to an individual to uniquely identify the individual for 
health purposes; information derived from the testing or examination of a body part or bodily 
substance, including genetic data and biological samples; or any information on e.g. a disease, 
disability, disease risk, medical history, clinical treatment, or the actual physiological or 
biomedical state of the data subject independent of its source, such as e.g. from a physician or 
other health professional, a hospital, a medical device, or an in vitro diagnostic test.’ 
 
At first sight it seems that reading Recital 26 could possibly solve the question of deciding 
when data is considered as health data. However, when breaking down the definition in Art 4 
(1) (12) and the Recital 26 of the GDPR, they actually do not say much new compared to the 
knowledge about health data that had been developed over the years when applying the DPD. 
Art 4 (1) (12) simply reiterates the opinion that health data is basically any personal data 
which reveals information about the health status of the data subject. The first part of the non-
exhaustive list in Recital 26 focuses rather on the data collected in the professional medical 
context (administrative data, data collected testing and examination of a body part or bodily 
substance). However, the last part of Recital 26 – ‘or any information on e.g. a disease, 
disability, disease risk, medical history, clinical treatment, or the actual physiological or 
biomedical state of the data subject independent of its source, such as e.g. from a physician or 
other health professional, a hospital, a medical device, or an in vitro diagnostic test,‘ – 
indicates a broader scope of the health data. The part ‘independent of its source’ may refer to 
the data collected by devices analysing a person's urine and blood, and apps measuring blood 
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pressure or heart rate, regardless of whether the testing is performed by medical professionals 
or by devices and apps freely available on the commercial market and irrespective whether 
these devices are marketed as medical devices or not. A clear example of such medical health 
data is a glucose-metering app that warns when the glucose level is too high and advises the 
user to take action.49 
 
Another interesting part of Recital 26 is the term ‘disease risk’ which refers to data 
concerning the potential future health status of a data subject. According to the Working 
Party, health data therefore also includes information about a person’s obesity, high or low 
blood pressure, hereditary or genetic predisposition, excessive alcohol consumption or drug 
use or any other information where there is a scientifically proven or commonly perceived 
risk of disease in the future.50 Accordingly, any individual piece of information, which could 
possibly affect the health status of a person, would be considered as health data. When blood 
pressure could be considered as information relating to person’s health already at the moment, 
then consumption of alcohol, for example, would not normally be considered as information 
directly referring to a person’s health. However, under the new explanation of the health data 
in Recital 26, such information could at some point be considered as health data.  
 
1.2.4 Health data in mHealth  
 
mHealth largely consists of different health and well-being mobile apps which have the 
purpose to collect and analyse data that users provide. The data collected can vary from the 
steps taken in a day to measuring glucose level in blood sugar. All this data could possibly 
show the health status of a person. However, Article 29 Working Party has dismissed the 
notion that any information about a person’s habits or acts would constitute health data. This 
concerns data from which no conclusions can reasonably be drawn about the health status of a 
data subject. Not all raw data collected (measurements) qualify as information (from which 
meaning can be derived) about the health of a person. For example, if a mobile app would 
only count the number of steps during a single walk, without being able to combine those data 
with other data from and about the same data subject, and in the absence of specific medical 
context in which the app data are to be used, the collected data are not likely to have a 
significant impact on the privacy of the data subject and do not require the extra protection of 
the special category of health data. They are thus considered raw (relatively low impact 
                                                 
49 Working Party, Annex, p 2. 
50 Ibid, p 2.  
 18 
lifestyle) personal data (provided, the app does not process location data), not information 
from which knowledge about that person’s health can be inferred.51 
 
There exist data that are ‘too raw’ to draw any conclusions from about the data subject’s 
health but at the same time, in some cases these same data become sufficient to be considered 
health data. At the moment, there is no clear answer to the question where to draw the line. At 
the same time, it is crucial to differentiate personal data and sensitive personal data. If data are 
health data, but mistakenly treated as ‘ordinary’ personal data, there is a risk that the high 
level of protection deemed necessary by the European legislator is undermined. Working 
Party has warned that if seemingly innocuous raw data are tracked over a period of time, 
combined with other data, or transferred to other parties who have access to additional 
complementary datasets, it may well be that even the seemingly most innocuous data, 
combined with other data sources, and used for other purposes, will come within the 
definition of ‘health data’.52 
 
European Data Protection Supervisor is on the opinion that there is no simple definitive 
answer to the question whether the data processed in health and well-being apps is considered 
health data. The assessment can only be done on a case-by-case basis. In the absence of a 
clear definition, after an assessment of the case-specific circumstances, the notion of what 
constitutes health data should be construed broadly, so as to include any data relating to a 
person’s physical and mental health information. Due account must be taken of the fact that it 
is not only the intrinsic nature of the information that identifies it as health data. The 
circumstances surrounding the gathering and processing of such information also play a 
role.53 As argued by the French national data protection authority, there is not always a clear 
distinction between the notion of health data and well-being information. 54 Rather, there is a 
continuum from cases where well-being information has little or no relation whatsoever to 
individual’s health to cases where - depending on the circumstances of data collection and 
                                                 
51 Working Party, Annex, p 3. 
52 Ibid, p 3. 
53 EDPS Opinion 1/2015 Mobile Health, 21 May 2015. - 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2015/15
-05-21_Mhealth_EN.pdf (5.03.2016), p 6. 
54 Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL), Le Corps, Nouvel Object Connecté, Cahiers 
IP no 2.  
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processing, including its scale and the purposes of the processing - the information clearly 
constitutes health data and is perhaps even used in a medical context.55 
 
In order to differentiate the processing of raw personal data and health data, the Working 
Party has brought out some more detailed aspects which should be taken into consideration.56 
In addition to looking at the character of the data, their intended use must also be taken into 
account in order to determine whether the data is considered as health data. For example, a 
single registration of a person’s weight, blood pressure or pulse/heart rate, at least without any 
further information about age or sex, does not allow for the inference of information about the 
actual or likely future health status of that person. However, when those measurements and 
information are collected over time, they may be used to determine a significant aspect of an 
individual's health, such as health risks related to obesity or an illness causing a significant 
loss of weight, high/low blood pressure, arrhythmia etc. A significant loss of weight may be 
due to several reasons, some positive (a drastic diet), some negative (impact of a harsh 
medical treatment; depression, etc.). When conclusions are drawn about someone's health, 
regardless of their reliability, these conclusions are to be treated as health data.57 
 
Moreover, there has to be a demonstrable relationship between the raw data set and the 
capacity to determine a health aspect of a person, based on the raw data or on the data in 
combination with data from other sources. For example, if a diet app only counts the calories 
as calculated from input provided by the data subject, and the information about the specific 
foods eaten would not be stored, it would be unlikely that any meaningful conclusions can be 
drawn with regard to the health of that person (unless the daily intake of calories is excessive 
in absolute terms). But if data from a diet app, or heart rate monitor or sleep diary app are 
combined with information provided by the data subject (directly or indirectly, for example 
based on information collected from that person's social networking profile), conclusions 
(whether accurate or inaccurate) may be drawn about that person's health condition, such as 
medical risk or diabetics. In these cases it is likely that health data can be inferred from the 
combined data.58  
 
                                                 
55 EDPS Opinion, p 6. 
56 Ibid, p 3. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
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In conclusion, although many cases must be looked individually, there are three different 
types of data which could be considered as health data for the purposes of mHealth. Firstly, 
when the data are inherently medical data (for example when the usage of a blood sugar 
measuring app is prescribed by the doctor in a patient-doctor relationship and the data is 
transferred to doctor). Secondly, when the data are raw sensor data that can be used in or in 
combination with other data to draw a conclusion about the actual health status or health risk 
of a person (for example the long-term data about person’s daily activity and alcohol 
consumption in order to evaluate the risk of certain diseases). Thirdly, when conclusions are 
drawn about a person’s health status or health risk.59 
 
1.3 Processing of Personal Data 
 
‘Processing’ is an essential term when analysing the applicability of the data protection rules 
to certain activities regarding personal data. The scope of the DPD as well as the GDPR is 
limited with those activities which involve processing of personal data.60 Therefore, it is 
important to understand the meaning of the term ‘processing’. Art 2 (b) of the DPD defines 
processing as ‘any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, 
whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, 
adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination 
or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction’. 
The definition includes various activities which could be carried out with personal data and it 
is hard to imagine an activity which entails personal data and which is not understood as 
processing.  
 
There is not a major change regarding the definition of processing in the GDPR. According to 
Art 4 (3) of the GDPR ‘processing’ means any operation or set of operations which is 
performed upon personal data or sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, 
such as collection, recording, organization, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, 
retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making 
available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction. There are only two 
noticeable changes. Firstly, ‘structuring’ is added to the list of means, which in the view of 
the author of this thesis does not lead to major changes in practice. Secondly, the term 
‘blocking’ is substituted with ‘restriction’, which is broader in the meaning and indicates that 
                                                 
59 Working Party, Annex, p 5. 
60 DPD, Art 3 (1); GDPR, Art 2 (1) 
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the activity does not have to completely block the data but also setting limits to accessing it 
(restriction) can count as processing.  
 
In order to analyse the processing activities that take place in mHealth, a short overview of 
the platforms used must be given. Most of the mHealth solutions are based on apps.  Apps are 
software applications designed for a specific task to be carried out on smartphones, tablet 
computers and smart watches. They organise information in a way suitable for the specific 
characteristics of the device and often closely interact with the hardware and operating system 
features present on the devices. The underlying operating system will also include software or 
data structures that are important for the core services of the smart device, for example, the 
address book of a smartphone. The operating system is designed to make these components 
available to apps through Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). Those APIs offer 
access to the multitude of sensors which may be present on smart devices. Such sensors 
include: a gyroscope, a digital compass and an accelerometer to provide speed and direction 
of movement; front and rear cameras to acquire video and photographs; and a microphone to 
record audio. The type, accuracy and frequency of these sensor data varies by device and the 
operating system. Through the API, app developers are able to collect such data continuously, 
access and write contact data, send email, SMS or social network messages, 
read/modify/delete SD card contents, record audio, use the camera and access stored pictures, 
read the phone state and identity, modify the global system settings and prevent the phone 
from sleeping. APIs can also provide information relating to the device itself through one or 
more unique identifiers and information about other installed apps. These data sources can be 
further processed, typically to provide a revenue stream, in a manner which may be unknown 
or unwanted by the end user.61  
 
When putting together the definition of processing and the description of apps’ working 
principles, it is possible to conclude that whenever personal data is involved in the apps (no 
matter if the person enters it himself or it is being collected by sensors to the app), the apps 
are processing personal data.  
 
However, not all processing of personal data falls under the protection of the data protection 
regulations. Art 3 (2) of the DPD stipulates that the DPD shall not apply when personal data 
                                                 
61 Article 29 Working Party, Opininon on apps on smart devices, adopted on 27 February 2013, WP 202. - 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2013/wp202_en.pdf (20.03.2016), p 4. 
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is processed by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity. 
Recital (12) of the DPD names – as an example – correspondence and the holding of records 
of addresses as such household activities. In today’s world the current DPD’s approach to 
personal or household processing has an unrealistically narrow scope that no longer reflects 
individuals’ capacity to process data for personal and household activities and has therefore 
become anachronistic.62 The GDPR adds to the list of examples that can fall under the 
household exemption social networking and on-line activity.63 
 
According to the Working Party, the household exemption could also apply to certain cases of 
processing of health data in mHealth. They argue that if the data processing only takes place 
on the device itself, and no personal data are transmitted outside the device, the law would not 
apply to the user, because of the exception of purely personal use, as laid down in Article 3 
(2) of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC.64 The author of this thesis agrees with the 
Working Party in this matter for two reasons. Firstly, the concerned personal data processed 
in the app or device is most likely the data of the owner of the device. Therefore, even when 
the app processes the data, it is being done only with regards to the person who has permitted 
the app to process it (by downloading and using the app). Secondly, if the personal data 
processed stays in the device and is not transmitted, there is much smaller risk that the 
processing could be a threat to the data subject’s privacy.   
 
In the GDPR, the household exemption stays in force. Therefore, it would still apply in the 
case of processing personal data in the device itself and not transmitting it. However, Recital 
15 states that the GDPR should apply to controllers or processors which provide the means 
for processing personal data for such personal or household activities, meaning that they still 
have a role to play in ensuring the processing complies with data protection law.65  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
62 Article 29 Working Party, Letter to EU Council president, Annex 2: Proposals for Amendments regarding 
exemption for personal or household activities, Brussels, 11 December 2013. - http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/documentation/other-document/files/2013/20130227_statement_dp_annex2_en.pdf 
(20.03.2016), p 2. 
63 GDPR, Recital 15. 
64 Working Party, Annex, p 5. 
65 Working Party, Annex 2, p 5. 
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1.4 Medical Devices 
 
When health data are being processed in the apps and devices, a question arises whether these 
apps and devices could fall under the category of ‘medical devices’. In the European Union, 
the medical devices are regulated under the Council Directive 93/42/EEC dated 14 June 1993 
(the Medical Devices Directive). The core legal framework consists of 3 directives: Directive 
90/385/EEC regarding active implantable medical devices, Directive 93/42/EEC regarding 
medical devices and Directive 98/79/EC regarding in vitro diagnostic medical devices. They 
aim at ensuring a high level of protection of human health and safety and the good 
functioning of the Single Market. These three main directives have been supplemented over 
time by several modifying and implementing directives, including the last technical revision 
by Directive 2007/47/EC. On 26 September 2012, the European Commission adopted a 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on medical devices 
and a Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on in vitro 
diagnostic medical devices which will, once adopted by the European Parliament and the 
Council, replace the existing three medical devices directives.66  
 
According to Art 1 (2) (a) of Directive 90/385/EEC (as amended by Directive 2007/47/EC) 
‘medical device’ means any instrument, apparatus, appliance, software, material or other 
article, whether used alone or in combination, together with any accessories, including the 
software intended by its manufacturer to be used specifically for diagnostic and/or therapeutic 
purposes and necessary for its proper application, intended by the manufacturer to be used for 
human beings for the purpose of: 
— diagnosis, prevention, monitoring, treatment or alleviation of disease; 
— diagnosis, monitoring, treatment, alleviation of or compensation for an injury or 
handicap; 
— investigation, replacement or modification of the anatomy or of a physiological 
process; 
— control of conception; 
and which does not achieve its principal intended action in or on the human body by 
pharmacological, immunological or metabolic means, but which may be assisted in its 
function by such means. 
                                                 
66 International telecommunication Union. Filling the gap: Legal and Regulatory Challenges of Mobile Health 
(mHealth) in Europe, 2014. -  https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Regional-
Presence/Europe/Documents/ITU%20mHealth%20Regulatory%20gaps%20Discussion%20Paper%20June2014.
pdf (20.03.2016), p 7. 
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An accessory is defined in Art 1 (2) (b) of Directive 90/385/EEC as being ‘any article which 
whilst not being a device is intended specifically by its manufacturer to be used together with 
a device to enable it to be used in accordance with the use of the device intended by the 
manufacturer of the device’.  
 
The International Telecommunication Union has analysed these definitions and has found the 
following. Medical device is recognized, above and beyond its functions, by its intended use 
as defined by the manufacturer; a medical device is therefore, to a certain extent, a finished 
product that should be regulated by a set of rules different from those governing any 
adaptations or uses that might be made of it independently of the end-uses assigned to it by its 
manufacturer. Software intended to be used specifically for diagnostic and/or therapeutic 
purposes is a medical device. Accordingly, it seems difficult to label a mobile terminal used 
by patient as a medical device, to the extent that this terminal does not meet the intended end-
uses of a medical device as defined above. However, software designed for diagnostic and/or 
therapeutic purposes that may be downloaded to a mobile telephone meets or may meet the 
preceding definitions and, consequently, may lie within the scope of the Directive of 14 June 
1993.67 
 
In order to provide guidance to the software developers, European Commission has issued 
non-binding Guidelines on the Qualification and Classification of Stand Alone Software Used 
in Healthcare within the Regulatory Framework of Medical Devices (the Guidelines)68. The 
Guidelines constitute a code of practice that the companies launching mHealth apps need to 
take into account. As the Guidelines offer more clarity on the question, whether the mHealth 
apps or devices could be considered as medical devices, the main criterion of the Guidelines 
will be brought out.  
 
The Guidelines' decisive criterion to classify medical devices is whether the software is 
intended to interpret (or to facilitate the interpretation of) data by modifying or representing 
health related individual information. Altering the representation of data purely for 
embellishment purposes is a nonmedical task.69 Therefore, a mHealth app is not a medical 
                                                 
67 International telecommunication Union, p 8. 
68 Guidelines on the Qualification and Classification of Stand Alone Software Used in Healthcare within the 
Regulatory Framework of Medical Devices. European Commission, DG Health and Consumer, Directorate B, 
Unit B2 ‘Health Technology and Cosmetics’, January 2012.  
69 Guidelines, p 10. 
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device if it performs an action limited to storing, archiving, compressing or transferring 
medical data, without interpreting/altering it.70 The same conclusion applies to an app limited 
to collecting and transmitting medical data from a(n) (in vitro) diagnostic medical device in 
the home environment to a doctor, without modifying its content.71  
 
The Directives do apply to tools combining medical knowledge with patient-specific 
physiological parameters.72 In addition, apps providing immediate decision-triggering 
information, or altering the representation of data in a way that contributes to the 
interpretative tasks performed by medical professional are subject to the Directives.73 Also, 
apps intended to provide additional information that contributes to diagnosis and/or treatment 
are qualified as medical devices.74  
 
The question whether an mHealth app or device falls under the medical devices regulations 
plays a role in the data protection regulation as well. Firstly, medical devices need to be in 
conformity with specific requirements set out in the Annex I of the Directive 90/385/EEC. 
Therefore, when an app or a device qualifies as a medical device, it imposes many different 
requirements on the developers and producers in order to show that their product is of good 
quality and does not endanger the health of a person. In the view of the author of this thesis, 
the data production requirements could also fall under the requirements of the medical 
devices and therefore, strict privacy policies and means to protect data should be adopted.  
 
Secondly, the question of consent arises. According to Art 8 (1) of the DPD, processing of 
sensitive data (including health data) shall be prohibited. However, there are several 
exceptions when this is allowed and the most relied upon exception is stipulated in Art 8 (2) 
(a) which allows processing of sensitive information if the data subject has given his or her 
explicit consent to the processing. Another exception comes from Art 8 (3), which states that 
processing is allowed (without data subject’s consent) if it is done for medical purposes by a 
health professional. In the field of mHealth, the last exception might not apply, as the 
processing is in many cases not specifically done by a professional, but rather by a software 
(automated processing). However, the circumstances are different when the GDPR enters into 
                                                 
70 Guidelines, p 10, 20.  
71 Ibid, p 14, 15, 20, 26. 
72 Ibid, p 20, 25. 
73 Ibid, p 10, 11. 
74 Ibid, p 20.  
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force. Art 9 (2) (a) of the GDPR allows processing of sensitive data when ‘processing is 
necessary for the purposes of preventive or occupational medicine, for the assessment of the 
working capacity of the employee, medical diagnosis, the provision of health or social care or 
treatment or the management of health or social care systems and services on the basis of 
Union law or Member State law or pursuant to contract with a health professional and subject 
to the conditions and safeguards referred to in paragraph 4’. Paragraph 4 states that the 
processing must happen by or under the responsibility of a professional subject to the 
obligation of professional secrecy. Therefore, it allows the processing by automated means in 
the apps and devices as long as it happens under the responsibility of a professional subject to 
the obligation of professional secrecy. In conclusion, it means that mHealth apps and devices 
falling under the definition of medical devices can process users’ sensitive data without the 
explicit consent requirements.  
 
1.5 Conclusion of the Chapter 
 
Understanding the content of the term ‘personal data’ is the basis of the data protection and 
has been already defined in the DPD and also analysed by Working Party. The four elements 
of the definition of personal data – ‘any information’; ‘relating to’; ‘identified or identifiable’ 
and ‘natural person’ – have remained the same in the GDPR and should be used in order to 
evaluate the nature of data used in the apps.  
 
The author of this thesis is in the opinion, that by adding the pseudonymisation tool to the 
GDPR, a better ground is established for the protection of the personal data in mHealth. As 
the pseudonymisation of data does put a heavy burden on the data processors but at the same 
time gives them several benefits, they are most probably willing to use the pseudonymisation 
tool. At the same time, the benefit for individual data subjects is considerable as the data 
subjects are no longer identified but their rights are still protected under the data protection 
principles. 
 
As the DPD does not have a definition of health data, it could have been argued that the 
protection of health data is therefore not sufficiently guaranteed as it is complicated to 
understand what health data entails. However, as it was brought out, the notion of health data 
has been explained by the courts and data protection authorities and the author of the thesis is 
in the position that deriving from these opinions it is possible to conclude what entails health 
data in mHealth. In conclusion, there are three types of health data in mHealth: medical data; 
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raw sensor data used in combination with other data to draw conclusions about person’s 
health; conclusions made about person’s health.  
 
Furthermore, the GDPR now includes a definition of health data which shows the legislator’s 
wish to put more emphasis on the protection of health data and eliminate possible confusions.  
The definition of health data includes the part ‘independent of its source’ which in the view of 
the author of this thesis aims to broaden the notion of health data making it not dependent on 
the provision of healthcare services. This is also relevant regarding mHealth as many apps 
measures health parameters but are not provided by health care professionals. Therefore, as 
the definition of health data is broader, data subjects can count on stricter protection of these 
kinds of data that have been collected in mHealth apps.  
 
In addition, it was brought out that regulations on medical devices can also play a role in the 
protection of personal data. If mHealth app or device is considered as a medical device, 
certain requirement must be fulfilled to bring the product to the market which means that the 
compliance with the data protection rules will also be guaranteed.  
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2. DATA PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS IN MHEALTH 
 
2.1 Introduction to Chapter 
 
In general, in order for the processing of personal data to be legitimate, two sets of most 
important rules must be fulfilled. Firstly, at least one condition of the six different bases to 
legitimise the processing of personal data must be satisfied. Consent is one of those bases and 
is most used. However, several requirements apply to obtaining consent and in cases of 
sensitive personal data these standards are even higher. When the consent is asked for 
processing in mHealth, different aspects come up that must be solved in order to determine 
the true validity of consent. 
 
Secondly, the principles concerning the data quality must be all fulfilled in order for the data 
processing to be in accordance with the data protection rules. There are six principles in the 
DPD and the GDPR, but only two of them will be analysed. The purpose limitation principle 
and data minimisation principle are the principles which have come up the most in the 
literature as the principles which are the most important but at the same time most criticised 
during the age of internet and processing of large amounts of data.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse how the mHealth relates to the general data protection 
requirements in order to answer the question whether the traditional data protection 
requirements provide efficient protection of personal data in mHealth.  
 
2.2 The Notion of Consent 
 
2.2.1 The Elements of Consent 
 
Pursuant to Art 7 (a) of the DPD, consent is one of the basis for making processing of 
personal data legitimate. Although consent is often used to legitimate the processing of 
personal data, especially in cases of sensitive data, it might be a weak basis and lose its value 
when it is stretched or curtailed to make it fit to situations it was never intended to be used in. 
If it is used in circumstances where it is not appropriate, because the elements that constitute 
valid consent are unlikely to be present, this would lead to great vulnerability and, in practice, 
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this would weaken the position of data subjects in practice.75 The European Data Protection 
Supervisor has stated in particular that ‘it is not always clear what constitutes true, 
unambiguous consent. Some data controllers exploit this uncertainty by relying on methods 
not suitable to deliver true, unambiguous consent’.76 In the same line, the Working Party has 
observed that ‘complexity of data collection practices, business models, vendor relationships 
and technological applications in many cases outstrips the individual’s ability or willingness 
to make decisions to control the use and sharing of information through active choice’.77 
Therefore, it is important to clarify the limits of consent and determine what the applicable 
conditions of valid consent mean. 
 
In the DPD, Art 2 (h) defines that the data subject’s consent shall mean any freely given 
specific and informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his 
agreement to personal data relating to him being processed. In addition, Art 7 (a) states that 
consent must be unambiguous. The GDPR assembles these requirements into one article and 
therefore, according to Art 4 (8) of the GDPR, the consent must fulfil those conditions: freely 
given, specific, informed and unambiguous.  
 
According to the definition in Art 2 (h) of the DPD, a consent can be expressed by ‘any … 
indication of his wishes … signifying’. This shows that a consent does not require a certain 
form, it just needs to be an indication. The fact that the indication can be of ‘any’ kind, opens 
the possibility of a wide understanding of the scope of such an indication. The minimum 
expression of an indication could be any kind of signal, sufficiently clear to be capable of 
indicating a data subject's wishes, and to be understandable by the data controller. The notion 
of ‘indication’ is wide, but it seems to imply a need for action. Other elements of the 
definition of consent, and the additional requirement in Article 7 (a) for consent to be 
unambiguous, support this interpretation. The requirement that the data subject must ‘signify’ 
his consent seems to indicate that simple inaction is insufficient and that some sort of action is 
required to constitute consent, although different kinds of actions, to be assessed ‘in context’, 
                                                 
75 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent, adopted 13 July 2011, WP187. - 
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http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp168_en.pdf (20.03.2016), p 17. 
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are possible.78 However, the part of the definition concerning ‘indication’ should be read 
differently, when consent is needed in order to process special categories of data according to 
Art 8 (2) (a) of the DPD, because then consent needs to be explicit, meaning that just any 
indication is not enough in order to legitimise processing of data.  
 
When relying on consent to legitimise processing of personal data, the first condition is that 
the consent must be freely given. The Working Party has stated that consent can only be valid 
if the data subject is able to exercise a real choice, and there is no risk of deception, 
intimidation, coercion or significant negative consequences if he or she does not consent. If 
the consequences of consenting undermine individuals’ freedom of choice, consent would not 
be free.79 The most common reason preventing consent to be free is a situation of 
subordination (an employment relationship), but other elements can also influence the 
decision of the data subject (e.g. financial, emotional or practical reasons).80  
 
The second condition requires the consent to be specific. To qualify as specific, the consent 
must be intelligible: it should refer clearly and precisely to the scope and the consequences of 
the data processing. Consent must be given in relation to the different aspects of the 
processing which are clearly identified, it cannot apply to an open-ended set of processing 
activities. This means that the parties should have an understanding and knowledge of which 
data are processed and for which purposed.81 It is possible that consent is given only once for 
different processing operations. However, in that case, those operations must fall within the 
reasonable expectations of the data subject and must be necessary in relation to the purpose of 
processing of personal data.82  
 
The third condition is linked to the previous condition and requires the consent to be 
informed. The Working Party has stated in its opinion regarding electronic health records, that 
a data subject’s consent must be based upon an appreciation and understanding of the facts 
and implication of an action. The individual concerned must be given, in a clear and 
understandable manner, accurate and full information of all relevant issues, in particular those 
specified in Articles 10 and 11 of the DPD (respectively Chapter III of GDPR), such as the 
                                                 
78 Working Party, Opinion 15/2011, p 11.  
79 Ibid, p 13.  
80 Ibid, p 14. 
81 Ibid, p 17.  
82 Ibid. 
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nature of the data processed, purposes of the processing, the recipients of possible transfers, 
and the rights of the data subject.83 Appropriate information has two sorts of requirements. 
Firstly, the quality of the information, indicating the way the information is given. Secondly, 
the accessibility and visibility of information, which means that the information must be given 
directly to individuals. It is not enough for information to be ‘available’ somewhere.84  
 
Finally, for consent to be legitimate, it has to fulfil the unambiguity requirement. In the DPD, 
unambiguity was stipulated separately from the definition of the consent and it was part of Art 
7 (a), which listed consent as one of the grounds for making processing of personal data 
legitimate. However, in the GDPR, unambiguity was brought to the definition of the consent 
in Art 4 (8).  The consent is unambiguous, when the indication by which the data subject 
signifies his agreement leaves no room for doubt regarding his or her intent. If there is a 
reasonable doubt about the individual's intention, there is ambiguity. This means that data 
controllers must create robust procedures for individuals to deliver their consent; namely 
either to seek clear express consent or to rely on certain types of procedures that deliver 
individuals’ clearly inferred consent.85 
 
As discussed before, consent is one of the six grounds for legitimising processing of personal 
data (Art 7 (a) of the DPD, Art 6 (1) (a) of the GDPR). However, consent can also be used in 
order to process special categories of data, which according to Art 8 (1) of DPD is in general 
prohibited. But in order to use consent as a basis in that case, the consent must be explicit (Art 
8 (2) (a)). Explicit consent has the same meaning as express consent, meaning that it 
encompasses all situations where individuals are presented with a proposal to agree or 
disagree to a particular use or disclosure of their personal information and they respond 
actively to the question, orally or in writing.86 Also, the Working Party has expressed that 
consent is not explicit if there is only a possibility to opt out from processing of special 
categories of personal data.87  
 
                                                 
83 Article 29 Working Party, Working Document on the processing of personal data relating to health in 
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protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2007/wp131_en.pdf (23.03.2016), p 9. 
84 Working Party, Opinion 15/2011, p 20. 
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Although the elements of consent have remained the same in the art 7 (2) of the GDPR, the 
data controllers will now have an increased burden to present declarations authorising the 
processing of personal data to a data subject in a distinguishable manner. In addition, Art 7 
(2) of the GDPR requires that request for consent must be presented in an intelligible and 
easily accessible form, using clear and plain language. This provision is necessary in order to 
avoid that declarations of consent could be hidden amongst pages of terms and conditions, 
which is a particular issue given the ubiquitous nature of computing in the modern 
information-dense world.88 Furthermore, Art 7 (4) of the GDPR emphasises that while 
assessing the ‘freely given’ condition of the consent, it is important that the performance of a 
contract, including the provision of a service, is not conditional on consent to the processing 
of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract. In the previous 
version of the draft of the GDPR89, the condition in Art 7 (4) was that consent will not be 
sufficient to allow the processing of an individual's personal data where there is a significant 
imbalance between the position of the data subject and the controller. Although the specific 
condition has changed, the underlying idea remains the same. A data subject should not feel 
pressured to consent to data processing. All of the additional conditions of consent included in 
Art 7 of the GDPR seek to improve the situation where most people do not feel that they are 
in control of their personal data.90 
 
2.2.2 Consent in mHealth 
 
During the last decades, the medical field has already grown accustomed to requiring formal 
forms of consent in order to meet the requirements concerning the provision of health 
services. The formalisation of consent is arguably related to the reduction of everyday, one-
to-one, face-to-face relations, tacit understandings between doctors and patients.91 Therefore, 
patients are usually asked for a formal consent before the provision of health services and if 
that is not possible or has not been done, there is extensive practice as to the interpretation of 
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person’s will and whether it could be counted as valid consent. Mobile technologies for health 
and the possibility of entering into medical treatment relationships independent of geographic 
location are causing further changes. These changes relate to the form of consent and the 
value that individuals and societies will attribute to it.92 In addition, the change in the medical 
field means change for the processing of medical data, which brings new challenges to the 
formal requirements of giving consent for legitimate processing. Some scholars have even 
posed the question whether social and technological developments will offer the possibility to 
express genuine informed consent consistent with what is intended in the data protection 
regulations.93  
 
As described before, there are different legitimate basis for processing health data: the 
existence of the treatment relationship between a doctor and a patient; or the individual 
consent given by data subject. Scholars and drafters of the regulations have different opinions 
on which of those should be preferred when seeking the legitimacy of processing in the field 
of mHealth or eHealth in general. In order to allow individuals to be able to give a truly 
informed consent, it should be possible to know what data and processing is actually required. 
However, in the light of the complexity of the information society, the drafters of the GDPR 
recognise that it is ‘difficult for an individual to know and understand if personal data are 
being collected, by whom, and for what purpose’.94 In the past years, the healthcare sector has 
been criticised for over relying on the use of consent to legitimise the processing of personal 
data. Probably, that is why, the GDPR will recognise that reliance on consent under the 
circumstances of today’s information society is less and less realistic as an option. Therefore, 
when is not clear to the data subject whether the data processing is actually ‘required’, 
consent should not be invoked and some other basis, such as treatment relationship should be 
sought.95 However, when consent is still needed, the GDPR describes the need for 
‘negotiating imbalances’ (Article 7) and about taking into account the situation of dependency 
(Recital 34). It is suggested that one should not be attributed choices he or she is unable to 
make, since this would impair the right to defend themselves.96  
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2.2.3 Application of Requirements of Consent in mHealth 
 
In the next paragraphs the formal requirements of consent will be placed into the context of 
mHealth through analysing problems that could potentially occur and assessing whether the 
proposed changes in the GDPR could possibly solve them. In order to specify the analysis and 
better understand the arising problems, the requirements will be examined through the 
example of a certain mHealth application, created for people suffering from diabetes to help 
them collect and monitor the level of glycose in their blood. At the moment, there are many 
apps available on the app stores which allow users to insert their glycose level.97 In the near 
future we will likely see wearable devices that can measure the glycose level with the help of 
a new non-invasive technology, which will use electricity or ultrasound to measure glycose 
through the skin. Other technologies may use special light that shines through the skin using a 
spectroscope to measure glucose level.98 This means that persons do not even have to insert 
the data themselves, but it will be automatically collected upon wearing the device. Although 
wearable devices that collect data about person’s activities are already widely used in the 
present day (for example activity monitors), the data collected may or may not fall under the 
category of health data. Therefore, the example of monitoring glycose level will be used, 
because glycose level is without a doubt health data.  
 
As demonstrated above, consent allowing the processing of health data must be explicit. 
Accordingly, only the schemes that utilise consent in an opt in, and not opt out (silence or 
inactivity) manner are deemed lawful.99 Therefore, in the context of mHealth, users should 
have a specific way of consenting to the processing of the health data. Taking the example of 
the glycose level monitoring device and an app processing such data, the best way to obtain 
legitimate data would be presenting the user a question whether he or she agrees with the 
processing of data collected while using this device. The consent should be asked before the 
user starts using the device and it should be presented in a clear and specific form, where the 
user him or herself can make an active choice of consenting. This could, for example, be a 
sentence after which the user ticks a box, which is presented in the user interface of an 
accompanying app.   
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Under the GDPR, explicit consent must be provided in written form. The specification that 
consent to medical data processing must be written is a positive innovation of the proposed 
regulation. Under the current regime, there is a lack of clarity about the form of consent and 
the issue has been solved differently in the EU member states. For example, in Belgium, 
explicit consent must be written, in other countries, the requirement of written consent is not 
mandatory. Recital 32 and Article 7 (1) of the GDPR now require that ‘where processing is 
based on the data subject’s consent, the controller shall be able to demonstrate that consent 
was given by the data subject to the processing of their personal data’. Therefore, the 
controller of data bears the burden of proof in a matter when the giving of consent is under 
question. In order to be able to prove the consent, a record should be kept, arguably in written 
form.100 Also, according to Art 7 (2) of the GDPR, the request for consent must be presented 
in a manner which is clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and 
easily accessible form, using clear and plain language. This would also apply to the glycose 
level device and app. The previously described option in which the person ticks a box after a 
sentence, would satisfy the needs of written consent when the data processor keeps record of 
the action of ticking the box and is able to prove it and this sentence which indicates consent 
is construed in a clear and plain language, clearly distinguishable from the rest of the terms 
and conditions.  
 
Another requirement of great importance in the field of mHealth is the notion of specific 
consent. The users need to have a specific understanding of what they consent to. When 
taking the example of the glycose level device and app, then the users should have exact 
knowledge of the categories of data collected, as well as their manner of processing and 
destination of transfer. For example, in addition to the mere numbers of glycose level, the app 
could also ask the user to insert body weight and height, combine it with the heart rate that the 
device is able to monitor and collect, and therefore, analyse a person’s health status. It would 
not be sufficient if the person just consents to the processing of its glycose level, but he or she 
also needs to consent to the combination of the processing of data that the device and app 
carry out.  
 
While the previously described ‘tick-box’ consent might fulfil the majority of the 
requirements for legitimate data processing, it also entails problems, especially concerning the 
requirement of informed consent.101 In order to make an informed decision, the data subject 
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must have the necessary information at his disposal to form an accurate judgement.102 The 
specific obligation to inform the users in the context of apps has been explained by Article 29 
Working Party in its opinion on apps on smart devices.103 As the Working Party argues, the 
requirement of informed consent is only fulfilled if the person has duly and correctly been 
informed about the key elements of the data processing. They bring out four requirements. 
Firstly, the information must be provided before the processing (which often starts during 
installation), otherwise it is not deemed sufficient and is legally invalid. Secondly, it must be 
told what data are being processed, which is particularly important given the broad access 
apps generally have to sensors and data structures on the device. Thirdly, the users need to 
know who is legally responsible for the processing of their personal data and how that 
controller can be contacted, otherwise they cannot exercise their rights, such as the right to 
access data stored about them. Due to the fragmented nature of the app landscape, it is crucial 
that every app has a single point of contact, taking responsibility for all the data processing 
that takes place via the app. It must not be left to the end user to research the relations 
between app developers and other parties processing personal data through the app. Fourthly, 
end users must be adequately informed which data are collected about them and why. Users 
should also be made aware in clear and plain language whether the data may be reused by 
other parties, and if so, for what purposes.104  
 
As the information that must be provided prior the processing is relatively wide, it cannot be 
narrowed down to one sentence. This becomes problematic, as in order to fulfil the 
requirement of informed consent, the app developer must provide a variety of information 
which is hard to present on a small screen. The Working Party has offered a solution of 
layered notices.105 This means that the initial notice to the user contains the minimum 
information required by the EU legal framework, and further information is available through 
links to the whole privacy policy. The information should be presented directly on screen, 
easily accessible and highly visible. Next to comprehensive information suitable for the small 
screen of mobile devices, users must be able to link through to more extensive explanations, 
for example in the privacy policy, how the app uses personal data, who the data controller is 
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and where a user can exercise his rights.106 However, the author of this thesis finds that the 
solution of layered notices might actually diminish the value of the consent that the users are 
giving. When the consent is given for the first time, there is a greater chance that the users are 
paying attention to what they are consenting to, so there is a possibility that they might even 
open the additional links provided in the app and actually read the information given. 
Nevertheless, when such consent is asked for several times, the users may not pay attention to 
the request anymore and are likely to just ‘tick the box’ in order to proceed with the activities 
the application or device is providing. When this happens, then the ‘ticking of the box’ by 
users cannot be considered as giving informed consent any more. Even though relevant 
information might be available to the data subject, the likelihood that he will actually access it 
and form its decision based on that information is relatively low. What is more, once the 
consent is given for one purpose, it should be asked again for any other processing activity 
which is slightly different from the previous one. When this is done for the processing which 
happens in the context of the app or device that the data subject has already used before, the 
value of the new consent asked from him has definitely a weaker value in the context of 
informed decisions. That is because the data subject will not delve into the details of the 
information given once again and therefore he or she will likely just tick the box. At the same 
time, the information provided, as well as the purposes and other relevant information 
regarding the processing might have substantially changed after the user has given his or her 
initial consent.  
 
2.3 Relevant Data Protection Principles 
 
2.3.1 About the Principles 
 
In order to analyse the main data protection principles and understand which problems arise in 
the field of mHealth, the substance and structure of those principles must be clarified. At first 
sight, there seems to be a difference in the current data protection legislation, the DPD, and 
the proposed GDPR. In the DPD, Section 1 is titled as ‘Principles relating to data quality’ and 
this section encompasses only one article – Art 6, which lists five conditions that all must be 
fulfilled when processing personal data. These conditions are generally accepted as data 
protection principles, which act as the starting point for more detailed provisions in the 
subsequent articles of the DPD. Moreover, all later data protection legislation at the EU level 
must comply with these principles and they must be kept in mind when interpreting such 
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legislation.107 In the GDPR, the structure of the articles has changed and it might be asked 
whether also the substance and meaning of principles has changed. In the GDPR, the whole 
Chapter II has been titled as ‘Principles’ and this chapter encompasses Articles 5 – 10 which 
in addition to listing the traditional data protection principles in Art 5, also include the 
conditions of lawfulness of processing, conditions for consent, processing of special 
categories of data and the processing not requiring identification. It might seem that all the 
conditions set out in those articles must now be considered as principles of data protection 
and must all be adhered to. However, the author of this thesis believes this not to be the 
intention of the drafters of the GDPR. Article 6 is titled as ‘lawfulness of processing’ and in 
principle has stayed the same as Art 7 of the DPD, which sets the criteria for making data 
processing legitimate. As previously explained, only one condition from this list must be 
fulfilled in order to make the data processing legitimate. Therefore, Art 6 of the GDPR should 
not be viewed as a general principle of data protection. What is more, the following articles 
stipulate the rules for special circumstances, for example, Art 7 establishes the rules that the 
consent must be in accordance with, when consent is used as a basis for legitimate processing. 
In addition, Art 5 of the GDPR is titled as ‘principles relating to personal data processing’. 
Therefore, the analysis of this chapter will be guided by the assumption that the principles of 
data protection are the rules stipulated in Art 6 of the DPD and Art 5 of the GDPR.  
 
Although the adoption of the GDPR is regarded as a substantial change in many aspects of the 
European data protection, there are no considerable changes in the underlying principles. 
Even the wordings of Art 6 of the DPD and Art 5 of the GDPR have remained almost 
unchanged. Positively, the ‘names’ of the principles have been added in the end of the clauses 
in Art 5 (1), clarifying the main idea of each condition and how a principle should be called. 
Therefore, the main principles as named in the GDPR are: lawfulness, fairness and 
transparency; purpose limitation; data minimisation; accuracy; storage limitation; integrity 
and confidentiality; accountability.108 Out of these, the fundamental principles underlying data 
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protection are purpose limitation and data minimisation principles.109 These two principles are 
also the most relevant in the field of mHealth, but they also cause the most problems while 
applying. That is why, the principles of purpose limitation and data minimisation will be 
analysed in depth in the following sections.   
 
2.3.2 Purpose Limitation Principle 
 
Purpose limitation is an essential principle in the system of data protection, because it 
contributes to transparency, legal certainty and predictability while aiming to protect the data 
subject by setting limits on how the data controllers can process their data.110 In essence, the 
principle of purpose specification means that the legitimacy of processing personal data will 
depend on the purpose of the processing. The purpose must have been specified and made 
manifest by the controller before the processing of data starts. The processing of personal data 
for undefined and/or unlimited purposes is unlawful. Every new purpose for processing data 
must have its own particular legal basis and cannot rely on the fact that the data were initially 
acquired or processed for another legitimate purpose. In turn, legitimate processing is limited 
to its initially specified purpose and any new purpose of processing will require a separate 
new legal basis. Disclosure of data to third parties will have to be considered especially 
carefully, as disclosure will usually constitute a new purpose and therefore require a legal 
basis, distinct from the one for collecting the data.111  
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The concept of purpose limitation consists of two parts: ‘purpose specification’ and 
‘compatible use’. The first part means that the data should be collected only for the ‘specified, 
explicit and legitimate purposes’.112 The condition of specified purpose lies at the core of the 
legal framework established for the protection of personal data. It sets the limits on the 
purposes for which the personal data could be used by the data controller. Therefore, it is 
extremely important that the purpose is determined already before the collection of data and is 
clearly and specifically identified. For example, ‘marketing purposes’ or ‘future research’ 
would not fulfil the requirement of specific purpose. At the same time, it must be kept in mind 
that overly detailed specifications can also be counter-productive as they are complicated to 
understand.113 Here, the Working Party has also offered the solution of ‘layered notice’, 
where basic information is provided in a concise manner just before the processing starts and 
there is a reference to where more detailed information could be found.114  
 
The purpose must also be explicit in a sense that it is clearly revealed, explained or expressed 
in some intelligible form. It is important in order to ensure that there is no vagueness or 
ambiguity to the meaning of the purpose and that the data subject understands it the same way 
as the data controller and processor.115  
 
The requirement of legitimacy extends to Art 7 of the DPD or Art 6 of the GDPR, which 
outline the criteria for making data processing legitimate by listing six different legal grounds. 
Therefore, for the purposes to be legitimate, the processing must be based on at least one of 
those legal grounds. In addition, the purposes must be in accordance with all provisions of 
applicable data protection law, as well as other applicable laws.116 
 
The second part of the purpose limitation principles is the notion of ‘compatible use’, more 
precisely that the personal data shall not be further processed in a way incompatible with 
initial purposes.117 Here, the term ‘further’ should be understood as differentiating the very 
first processing operation, which is collection, and all other subsequent processing activities. 
The fact that further processing cannot be incompatible (not that it must be compatible) 
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indicates some flexibility to further use. The fact that further processing has a different 
purpose does not necessarily mean that it is incompatible.118  
 
2.3.3 Data Minimisation Principle 
 
The data minimisation principle is closely tied with the purpose limitation principle. The 
wording of the article itself refers to the purposes in order to determine whether this principle 
has been fulfilled. Although the data minimisation principle is listed together with other data 
protection principles in Art 6 of the DPD (Art 5 of the GDPR), some experts have not given it 
the status of a principle equal to the other ones in Art 6. For example, Serge Gutwirth has 
found that data minimisation is something that in essence mandates that all processing is both 
adequate for and limited to a specific purpose, therefore, the data minimisation is much more 
than just a principle. Its existence ensures the omnipresence of the fair information principles 
of adequacy, purpose limitation, duration, etc. in data processing, thus making it a basis for all 
other principles.119 However, others have found that data minimisation is not so much a 
principle, but a technical mean of ensuring that all other principles are adhered to.120 This 
thesis is written from the perspective that data minimisation is a principle like all other 
principles named in Art 6 of the DPD and Art 5 of the GDPR and needs to be followed while 
processing personal data.  
 
A short overview of the amended wording of this principles should be given. In the DPD, the 
principle of data minimisation states that the processing must be ‘adequate, relevant and not 
excessive in relation to the purpose for which they are collected and/or further processed’.121 
In the GDPR, the wording has been slightly changed to ‘adequate, relevant and limited to 
what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed’.122 The biggest 
difference is in the third element of the principle – ‘not excessive in relation’ versus ‘limited 
to what is necessary’. It is unknown whether by changing this wording, the drafters of the 
legislation were trying to change the substance of the principle. However, the author of this 
thesis argues that the change can have a substantial meaning while interpreting this principle. 
While the wording of the DPD uses negation, it gives it more flexible meaning. The 
                                                 
118 Working Party. Opinion 03/2013, p 21.; See chapter 3.2.4 of this thesis.  
119 S. Gutwirth. Short Statement about the role of consent in the European Data Protection Directive. 2012. - 
https://works.bepress.com/serge_gutwirth/80/ (10.04.2016) 
120 Working Party, Annex, p 6. 
121 DPD, Art (6) (1) (c) 
122 GDPR, Art 5 (1) (c) 
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processing must rise to the threshold of being clearly excessive in order for the principle to be 
violated. However, the GDPR uses affirmative wording, which makes the interpretation of 
this principle less flexible. The data processed must be clearly limited to what is necessary, 
meaning that the threshold of the boundaries of minimal data is much lower and it is easier to 
come to a situation when data is processed unnecessarily. 
 
2.3.4 Purpose Limitation and Data Minimisation in mHealth 
 
These two principles offer the data subject the most protection from the data controller or 
processor. At the same time, they also conflict the most with the notion and substance of what 
mHealth is – a way of collecting large amounts of health data from a person in order to 
forward and/or analyse it for the benefit of the person.  
 
From the context of the apps, the purpose limitation principle enables users to make a 
deliberate choice to trust a party with their personal data. Importantly, they will learn how 
their data are being used, and will be able to rely on the limitative purpose description to 
understand for what purposes their data will be used. The purposes of the data processing 
therefore need to be well-defined and comprehensible for an average user without expert legal 
or technical knowledge. At the same time, purpose limitation requires that app developers 
have a good overview of their business case before they start collecting personal data from 
users.123 However, the purpose limitation principle does not consider sudden changes in the 
data processing activities. For example, if an app originally carried a purpose to monitor a 
person’s daily activities (for example activity tracking apps on smart watches which count the 
steps), but the developer decides to change its business model and merge these data with the 
location data of the person and find out in which locations the person is the most active. In 
such cases, the respective data controllers would have to individually approach all users and 
ask for their prior unambiguous consent for the new purpose of their personal data 
processing.124  
 
The view of the Working Party brought out in the last sentences of the previous paragraph 
seems to rather depreciate the purpose limitation principle and favour the app developers who 
wish to use the data collect for other purposes for which it was collected. The author of this 
thesis is in the opinion that although the asking of additional consent from the data subjects 
                                                 
123 Working Party, Opininon on apps on smart devices, p 22. 
124 Ibid, p 17. 
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might need some extra time and resource, it should still be done in order to comply with the 
purpose limitation principle. Another possibility to use data for further processing without the 
consent of the data subject derives from the DPD, but this will be discussed in chapters 3.2.3 
and 3.2.4.  
 
In order to comply with the principle of data minimisation and prevent unnecessary and 
potentially unlawful data processing, app developers in the field of mHealth must carefully 
consider which data are strictly necessary to perform the desired functions. Apps can obtain 
access to many of the functions in the device, and are therefore capable to execute a variety of 
operations, such as sending an SMS, or accessing images and the entire address book. Many 
app stores support (semi) automated updates where the app developer can integrate new 
features and make those available with little or no interaction by the end user. Access to the 
underlying data on the device through the APIs gives operation system and device 
manufacturers and app stores an opportunity to enforce specific rules and offer appropriate 
information to end users. For example, operation system and device manufacturers should 
offer an API with precise controls to differentiate each type of these data and ensure that app 
developers can request access to only those data that are strictly necessary for the (lawful) 
functionality of their app. The types of data requested by the app developer can then be 
clearly displayed in the app store to inform the user prior to installation.125 
 
The following example illustrates what can be understood by data minimisation: when 
designing a mobile app with the purpose of helping fight obesity, developers should ensure 
that it only collects the personal data necessary for that purpose. In that respect, although it 
might sometimes facilitate calorie tracking (e.g. by allowing users to scan the bar code of 
food they buy), further use by the operator of the information about users’ preferences on 
product brands goes beyond the primary purpose of the app and thus would be excessive.126 
 
The drafters of the Code of Conduct for mHealth127 have advised the actors of mHealth on 
how to comply with the purpose limitation principle. They state that the mHealth app must be 
designed only to collect and process data concerning health for specific and legitimate 
purposes. These purposes must be clearly defined before any data processing takes place, and 
                                                 
125 Working Party, Opininon on apps on smart devices, p 17. 
126 EDPS Opinion, p 10. 
127 Initiative of the European Commission to develop a code of conduct for app developers during the meetings 
of the stakeholders. See: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/mhealth-green-paper-next-steps  
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must bear a meaningful relationship to the functionality of the app. Once the purposes have 
been decided and clearly communicated to the user, the app may only process the data for 
compatible purposes – with the consent of the user and as required for the functionality of the 
app – as long as the assessment of the compatibility is done on a case by case basis 
consideration:  
- the relationship between the initial purpose and the purpose for further compatible 
processing;  
- the context of collection and the expectation of the user;  
- the sensitivity of the data and the impact on user of the further processing;  
- the safeguards that the developer has implemented to prevent any undue impact on the 
user.  
For example, a developer providing an app that monitors blood sugar concentration levels to 
assist diabetes patients in dispensing medication is not allowed to sell this information to 
vendors of medication. The commercial exploitation of data concerning health by third parties 
is not compatible with the original purpose of providing assistance to diabetes patients. If the 
personal data is to be used for a purpose other than the initial or compatible purpose of 
collection, the personal data must either be completely anonymised before re-using it 
(removing any possibility to identify an individual on the basis of the data), or alternatively, 
free, informed and explicit consent of the users with the new use must be obtained.128 
 
Such advice is clearly valuable to app developers and other actors in the field of mHealth, but 
the ultimate purpose of this advice is and shall be protection of personal data. Although the 
principles of purpose limitation and data minimisation may seem too burdensome for some, 
especially in the field of mHealth, where large amounts of data are processed. However, by 
complying with these principles, the app developer gain users’ trust and will eventually 
benefit more from the usage of their apps.  
 
2.4 Conclusion of the Chapter 
 
The requirement of consent is a crucial concept in the field of mHealth. Although, for 
processing health data, a patient-doctor relationship is also a legitimate ground, in mHealth, 
this relationship usually does not exist. Therefore, in order for the processing to be allowed, a 
                                                 
128 Draft of the Code of Conduct of mHealth. - 
https://www.bmjv.de/DE/Ministerium/Veranstaltungen/SaferInternetDay/Code_of_Conduct_SID.pdf?__blob=p
ublicationFile&v=3 (10.01.2016), p 5. 
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valid consent must be asked from the data subject. The regular requirements of consent 
(freely given, informed, specific) must be applied when asking consent in mHealth and as 
shown through the example of a glycose metering app, this can be effectively done. As the 
data collected is health data, the consent shall also be explicit and after the adoption of the 
GDPR, also in a written form. These requirements fulfil the purpose of protecting the data 
subject from the breach of his right to privacy, because while consenting to the processing 
he/she shall have every possible opportunity to understand to what kind of processing he/she 
is consenting to.  
 
The purpose limitation principle and data minimisation principle were analysed from the 
perspective of DPD and GDPR together, as there were no notable changes to these principles 
in the GDPR. Although the applicability of those principles has been challenged, it was found 
that in the view of the data protection authorities these principles are the most effective 
manner to protect the data subject from the unauthorised usage of their personal data by third 
parties and the author of this thesis agrees with it. Although, for the app developers it may be 
sometimes complicated to understand what obligation they have to fulfil in order to be in 
compliance with these principles, that should not undermine the value of these principles. In 
order to promote the compliance with the principles and in general with the data protection 
requirement, a Code of Conduct for the app developers is being drafted.  
 
It must be concluded that the traditional data protection requirements as explained in this 
chapter, still remain an effective method to guarantee the protection of personal data. mHealth 
brings new situations and problems to the application of data protection requirements, for 
example how to ask for a legally valid consent on the small screen, or how to guarantee the 
compliance with the data minimisation principle one of the benefits of mHealth applications 
is their ability to analyse large sets of different data. However, the author of this thesis finds 
that the rising problems shall not be the reason for ignoring the data protection requirements. 
Instead, new solutions shall be found and advice given to the stakeholder but also to the 
persons on how to protect their data. Therefore, it can be concluded that the traditional data 
protection requirements analysed in this chapter are in general a sufficient way to protect the 
personal data.  
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3. SECONDARY USE OF HEALTH DATA COLLECTED IN mHEALTH  
 
3.1 Introduction to Chapter 
 
Pursuant to the purpose limitation principle, the data should only be processed for the initial 
purposes for which it was collected. When the data is transferred from the device, then the 
initial purpose will be exceeded and additional grounds for processing are needed. This is 
called the further processing or secondary use of data and is also regulated under the DPD and 
GDPR.  
 
One of activities where further processing is used, is big data processing. Secondary use of 
data is becoming widespread in the age of big data. Although there are other possibilities to 
use the health data after the initial collection (for example, electronic health records), big data 
is chosen in this thesis as a basis for the analysis, because it has the most potential of violating 
the protection of personal data rules. When person’s data are used without his/her consent and 
put into combination with other data, results of such big data processing might be used against 
the person (profiling) or the data might just be disclosed. It will be also discussed whether the 
data protection principles are in general justified in tha age of big data as suggested by some 
authors.  
 
Although, normally each processing activity requires data subject’s consent, there is an 
exception in the DPD and the GDPR according to which the processing for scientific, 
historical or statistical purposes shall be deemed to be incompatible with the initial purpose. If 
big data processing were to fall under this exception, big data processing could be concluded 
without the data subject’s consent. The author of this thesis is in the opinion that when such 
processing would be allowed for big data, it would seriously breach the personal data 
protection principle. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is the answer the question whether it is 
possible to conclude big data processing on tha basis of the exception of scientific, historical 
or statistical purposes.  
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3.2 Big Data Processing 
 
3.2.1 Notion of Big Data 
 
Big data processing is defined as a practice when huge volumes of diversely sourced 
information are combined and analysed with the help of sophisticated algorithms. Big data 
relies on the increasing ability of technology to support the collection and storage of large 
amounts of data and also on its ability to analyse, understand and take advantage of the full 
value of data (in particular using analytics applications).129 Another definition relies on the 
main characteristics of big data and describes it as high-volume, high-velocity and high-
variety information assets that demand cost-effective, innovative forms of information 
processing for enhanced insight and decision making.130 Following this definition, big data is 
often described in terms of the ‘three Vs’: volume, variety and velocity. By volume, it is 
meant that big data uses massive datasets, which are so large that they cannot be analysed 
using ‘traditional’ methods such as MS Excel spreadsheets, etc. By variety, it is meant that the 
data is brought together from different sources. Lastly, the notion of velocity stipulates that 
much of the big data analysis is done in high speed, sometimes even in real time.131  
 
Many instances of big data processing do not involve personal data. For example, processing 
weather or traffic data can bring many useful insights to the climate change or organisation of 
cities. However, there are numerous cases of big data processing that do involve processing 
personal data, which triggers the application of data protection regulations. It is possible that 
the big data processing is the first processing activity and the data subject is giving his 
consent for such processing. Yet, big data processing often involves repurposing personal data 
that was obtained for a different purpose and in some cases by another organisation.132 In 
addition, big data processing also has the potential to create new personal data. For example, 
social media and other data about an individual could be analysed to analyse that person’s 
lifestyle as a factor determining whether they are at risk of developing a medical condition.133 
                                                 
129 European Data Protection Supervisor. Opinion 7/2015. Meeting the challenges of big data. 19 November 
2015. -
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2015/15
-11-19_Big_Data_EN.pdf (25 March 2016), p 7.   
130 Gartner IT Glossary Big Data. http://www.gartner.com/it-glossary/big-data/ (25.04.2016) 
131 International Commissioner’s Office. Big Data and Data Protection. - https://ico.org.uk/media/for-
organisations/documents/1541/big-data-and-data-protection.pdf (25 March 2016), p 6-7. 
132 Ibid, p 9.  
133 Ibid, p 11. 
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Even when the data is at first anonymised, it can easily become personal data, as it is 
becoming increasingly convenient to infer a person’s identity by combining allegedly 
‘anonymous’ data with publicly available information such as that accessible through social 
media. Furthermore, with the rise of the ‘Internet of Things’, much of the data collected and 
communicated by the increasing number of personal and other devices and sensors will be 
personal data: the data collected can be easily related to the users of these devices whose 
behaviour they will monitor. These may include highly sensitive data including health 
information and information relating to our thinking patterns and psychological make-up.134 
 
It is expected that big data may ultimately lead to better and more informed decisions. For 
example, big data may bring new discoveries in scientific and medical research, increase self-
knowledge of individuals, enable to provide more personalised products, services and medical 
treatments better suited to an individual, and facilitate automated decision-making for 
businesses and other data processing organisations. These automated decisions, in turn, may 
lead to increased efficiency, with prospects of various commercial and other applications.135 
Big data will not only offer value to the society by research results, but the services and 
products generated from these results. Regarding health data, this value will mean better, 
quicker and cheaper diagnosis and treatment, as the application of big data to healthcare 
offers a way to accelerate research, improve treatment and reduce burden on the society 
overall.136 
 
While big data has a potential of becoming beneficial to the society in many different ways, it 
has also raised serious concerns about its impact on the rights and freedoms of individuals, 
including privacy.137 As previously mentioned, the main idea of big data is to gather as much 
data as possible for as many purposes as possible and to retain this data for as long as 
possible. This, however, conflicts with the basic principles of data protection, especially the 
principles of purpose limitation and data minimisation. Some advocates of big datahave 
argued that the rise of big data represents a fundamental challenge to established data 
protection principles and the current model based on stating purposes at the outset and 
obtaining consent for the processing no longer works because of the complexity of the 
                                                 
134 European Data Protection Supervisor. Opinion 7/2015, p 7. 
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analytics and people’s perceived lack of interest in how their data is used. Furthermore, some 
claim we risk losing the benefits that can be derived from big data if we attempt to confine it 
within an outdated framework of data protection.138 Some even demand that derogations from 
the principles of purpose limitation and data minimisation should be made, because they do 
not take into account the propensity of big data to re-use data for different purposes.139  
 
During the drafting of the GDPR, several institutions provided their views on the matters that, 
in their opinion, should be changed in the new regulation. While the applicability of the 
traditional data protection principles was brought up in the debates, most of the data 
protection institutions remained of the opinion that these principles carry a substance and 
value which could not be undermined or simply put aside. The Working Party issued a 
statement explaining that there is no reason to believe that the EU data protection principles 
are no longer valid and appropriate for the development of big data. Instead, they should be 
subject to further improvements to make them more effective in practice.140  
  
In addition, the European Data Protection Supervisor also stated that in order to allow 
innovation and at the same time protect fundamental rights, the established principles of 
European data protection law should be preserved but applied in new ways.141 In its Opinion 
3/2015, the EDPS made clear that the current data protection principles, including necessity, 
proportionality, data minimisation, purpose limitation and transparency must remain as key 
principles. They provide the base line in order to protect the fundamental rights in a world of 
big data.142 At the same time, these principles must be strengthened and applied more 
effectively, and in a more modern, flexible, creative, and innovative way. They must also be 
complemented by new principles such as accountability and data protection and privacy by 
design and by default. Increased transparency, powerful rights of access and data portability, 
and effective opt-out mechanisms may serve as preconditions to allow users more control 
over their data, and may also help contribute to more efficient markets for personal data, to 
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the benefit of consumers and businesses alike.143 UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office 
agreed with the EDPS’s view in its opinion ‘Big Data and Data Protection’. They stated that 
the data protection principles should not be seen as a barrier to progress. As the current 
principles have some flexibility, they could instead be used as a framework to promote 
privacy rights. 144   
 
In sum, it was generally agreed that traditional data protection principles should not be 
changed in order to facilitate the big data processing. Following the negotiations over the text 
of the GDPR, the principles did remain unchanged. However, several other changes were 
made in order to facilitate the use of big data processing while preserving sufficient protection 
of personal data. 
 
3.2.2 Big Data in mHealth 
 
Big data is expected to have a significant positive impact on healthcare. It allows establishing 
connections and extracting additional information from the sets of previously unrelated data, 
providing new insights for medical research, that were impossible to obtain before.145 It will 
make it possible to link diseases to human behaviour, lifestyle or other causes that are 
characteristic of a given geographic area or group of people. Big data may also facilitate 
decision-making or collection of relevant information on the user side.146  
 
Nonetheless, big data might also pose a risk to data subjects when the insights obtained are 
commercially exploited. For example, when a pharmaceutical company is able to identify the 
financial resources of its customers and their need for a specific drug (while combining data 
collected through different apps the person is using), the company might want to charge more 
from these customers who have better financial possibilities. In that case, big data would 
facilitate group discrimination. Therefore, there is a direct relationship between the 
availability of large sets of health data and the potential profitability of a number of industries 
active in the healthcare sector. Moreover, the widespread collection of sensitive health data 
will open the door to profiling and possible adverse selection, for example for employment or 
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insurance purposes. For example, there is a possibility that insurance companies start 
promoting the use of monitoring devices and genetic screenings, by giving better payment 
conditions to persons who monitor their health. However, if all insurance companies and 
private healthcare providers adopt an in-depth monitoring of personal health data as a 
standard practice in order to adapt their commercial offering to each customer, they may 
automatically refuse coverage to those who object to such disclosure or sharing, regardless of 
their health conditions or risk factors. As a result, the practice of sharing data will 
automatically result in discrimination against those who prefer not to disclose or share their 
health data.147 In order to avoid the exploitation of personal data and discrimination based on 
data sharing, the safeguards must be used and the users must be aware of the rights they have 
under the data protection regulations.148  
 
The last pages of the thesis will focus on the possibilities how the big data processing of 
health data collected through mHealth fits under the current and future rules and whether 
these rules provide enough protection for individual privacy.  
 
3.2.3 Big Data Processing for Scientific, Historical or Statistical 
 
As explained in chapter 2, the purpose of the data processing must be determined and 
disclosed to the data subject and processing which does not fall under the initial processing is 
not legitimate. Under regular circumstances, each data processing activity should be 
individually analysed and decided whether the personal data is processed in a way compatible 
with the set purposes. However, Art 6 (1) (b) of the DPD which stipulates the purpose 
limitation principle, also allows further processing of data for historical, statistical and 
scientific research purposes. This means that when data is used for these named purposes, the 
purpose is considered as compatible. However, in that case, appropriate safeguards must be 
used. It is noted in Recital 29 of the DPD that the typical purpose of the safeguards is to ‘rule 
out’ that the data will be used to support measures or decisions regarding any particular 
individual. The term ‘rule out’ suggests that the safeguards should indeed be strong enough to 
exclude or at least minimise any risks to the data subjects.149 Under the current DPD 
framework, it is up to each member state to specify the appropriate safeguards. This 
specification is typically provided in legislation, which could be precise or more general. In 
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Art 5 (1) (b) of the GDPR, instead of giving member states the right to determine relevant 
safeguards, reference is made to Art 89, which stipulates that the safeguards must be in 
accordance with the GDPR, meaning that member states do not have the discretion to 
determine safeguards in their national laws. While there is no definitive list of the appropriate 
safeguards, pseudonymisation is brought as an example. The GDPR requires that technical 
and organisational measures shall be in place in order to ensure respect for the principle of 
data minimisation.  
 
In addition to the reference to safeguards, the provision concerning the purpose limitation 
principle in the GDPR sets a new exception to the purpose limitation principle. According to 
Art 5 (1) (b) the further processing for archiving purposes in the public interest shall not be 
considered as incompatible with the initial purposes. The author of this thesis finds that big 
data processing would not fall under this exception. Firstly, the core of the big data processing 
is to actively use the data, not only store it. Secondly, even when the data is stored for further 
big data processing, it would already exceed the limits of this exception. The author thus 
believes that the notion ‘archiving for public interest’ rather means the storage of data by state 
institutions.  
 
As the provision of purpose limitation principles remains the same in the DPD and the GDPR, 
the following analysis of the three exceptions – scientific, historical, statistical purpose –
applies to both the DPD and the GDPR. Firstly, ‘statistical’ purposes covers a wide range of 
processing activities, from commercial purposes (e.g. analytical tools of websites or big data 
applications aimed at market research) to public interests (e.g. statistical information 
produced from data collected by hospitals to determine the number of people injured as a 
result of road accidents).150 Although Article 29 Working Party has categorised big data 
analysis under the ‘statistical’ purposes in its opinion on purpose limitation principle, there 
are different standings on whether the big data analysis falls under this exception.  
 
Secondly, processing for ‘historical’ purposes can also have specific characteristics and this 
may require a different set of safeguards. Member states often have specific laws governing 
access to national archives, archives on recent history of particular interest and court files kept 
by the judiciary.151 Therefore, this exception can be seen as relating to the ‘archiving for 
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public interest’ exception. While the latter makes it possible to archive the data, the former 
makes it possible to process the archived data for historical purposes.  
 
Thirdly, the ‘scientific’ purposes are meant for a situation when there may be a need to access 
different kinds of data. For example, some research may require raw microdata, which are 
only partially anonymised or pseudonymised. In other cases, research purposes involved can 
only be fulfilled if the pseudonymisation is reversible: for example, when research subjects 
need to be interviewed at a later stage in a longitudinal study. Further, publication of research 
results should, as a rule, be possible in such a way that only aggregated and/or otherwise fully 
anonymised data will be disclosed.152 
 
A question arises whether it is possible to use the exception for scientific, historical and 
statistical purposes when processing health data. The Working Party has expressed an opinion 
that further processing of personal data concerning health (in addition to data about children, 
other vulnerable individuals, or other highly sensitive information) should, in principle, be 
permitted only with the consent of the data subject. Any exceptions to this requirement for 
consent should be specified in law, with appropriate safeguards, including technical and 
organisational measures to prevent undue impact on the data subjects (in case of doubt, the 
processing should be subject to prior authorisation of the competent data protection 
authority); exceptions should only apply with regard to research that serves an important 
public interest, and only if that research cannot possibly be carried out otherwise.153 The 
Working Party’s opinion has been also included to the GDPR by expressing the same view in 
Recital 53154 and Art 9 (2) (j). Art 9 (2) (j) gives an exception to the prohibition on processing 
health data and allows it when processing is necessary for archiving purposes in the public 
interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes in accordance with 
Art 89 (1) based on the EU or member state law which shall be proportionate to the aim 
pursued, respect the essence of the right to data protection and provide for suitable and 
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specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests of the data subject. 
Therefore, in theory, it is possible to carry out big data processing with health data while 
relying on the scientific purpose exception. However, as Recital 53 emphasises that in such 
case the research should meet an objective of public interest. Also, Recital 53 points out the 
management and central national health authorities as the conductors of such research and 
other permitted activities.  
 
It can be concluded that big data processing may fall under the exception from the purpose 
limitation principle, when the big data processing serves a scientific, historical or statistical 
purpose. However, the lawfulness of the big data processing of the data gathered in mHealth 
depends largely on the greater purpose of the big data processing and the processors. If the 
big data processing were to be carried out by state institutions in order to carry out a research 
for the welfare of the public, the big data processing would be lawful even without the 
consent of the data subjects. However, when a private company wishes to carry out big data 
processing for the benefit of itself or even for the benefit of, for example, users of one specific 
app, a separate consent would have to be asked from the data subjects.  
 
3.2.4 Big Data Processing for Other Purposes 
 
Concerning the safeguards to be adopted, the notion of functional separation may be of 
particular relevance. Functional separation means that data used for statistical purposes or 
other research purposes should not be available to support measures or decisions that are 
taken with regard to the individual data subjects concerned (unless specifically authorised by 
the individuals concerned).  To comply with this requirement, controllers need to guarantee 
the security of the data, and take all other necessary technical and organisational measures to 
ensure functional separation.155 The other possible safeguards include full anonymisation and 
partial anonymisation.156 Directly identifiable personal data may be processed only if 
anonymisation or partial anonymisation is not possible without frustrating the purpose of the 
processing, and further provided that other appropriate and effective safeguards are in place. 
 
When big data processing does not fall under the scientific, statistical and historical purpose 
exception, it must be evaluated whether there might be another ground for making such 
processing legitimate. The firmest ground would be asking for the consent from the data 
                                                 
155 Working Party. Opinion 03/2013, p 30. 
156 Ibid, p 30. 
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subject. However, one of the virtues of the big data processing lies in the fact that while 
analysing large amounts of data which are gathered from different sources, it is possible to 
come to conclusions or discover correlations that are in the first place not even sought.157 This 
means that it is nearly impossible to obtain valid consent from the data subject when at the 
time of asking consent even the data controllers do not know for what purposes exactly the 
data will be used. At the same time, the potential of big data would be wasted if there is no 
possibility to further process the data to discover unknown correlations. The DPD is rather 
strict concerning further processing of data, unless it is concluded for scientific, historical or 
statistical purposes. However, the Working Party has expressed an opinion that the fact the 
further processing is for a different purpose does not necessarily mean that it is automatically 
incompatible and this needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.158  
 
According to the UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office, the key factor in deciding 
whether a new purpose is incompatible with the original purpose is whether it is fair. This 
means it is necessary to consider how the new purpose affects the privacy of the individuals 
concerned and whether it is within their reasonable expectations that their data could be used 
in this way.159  
 
The GDPR is introducing more specific rules on factors a controller must take into account to 
assess whether a new processing purpose is compatible with the purpose for which the data 
were initially collected. Art 6 (4) of the GDPR lists the factors160 which should be taken into 
account and it will be analysed how those factors should be viewed while big data processing 
is concluded with the health data collected in the mHealth apps.161 The first factor includes 
whether there is any link between the purposes for which the personal data have been 
collected and the purposes of the intended further processing. The data subject is generally 
using the mHealth app in order to track his or her own health. The data might be just stored in 
the app or it might also be analysed in order to draw some conclusions from it, for example, to 
find out the average blood pressure during certain period of time. The author of this thesis 
finds that the link between tracking your own health and using this data for big data 
                                                 
157 S. Barocas, H. Nissembaum. Big Data’s End Run around Anonymity and Consent. – J. Lane, V. Stodden, S. 
Bender et al (eds.). Privacy, Big Data and the Public Good. Cambridge University Press 2014, p 60.; 
International Commissioner’s Office, p 21. 
158 Working Party. Opinion 03/2013, p 21.  
159 International Commissioner’s Office, p 22.  
160 GDPR, Art 6 (4) (a)-(e) 
161 See also GDPR, Recital 50. 
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processing is not strong enough in order to allow such processing without separate consent. 
The second factor concerns the context in which the personal data have been collected. In 
particular the relationship between data subjects and the controller, should be taken into 
account. The third factor requires to take into account the nature of the personal data, in 
particular whether special categories of personal data are processed or whether personal data 
related to criminal convictions and offences are processed. The author of this thesis is in the 
opinion that this clause is the biggest obstacle when trying to see big data processing as 
compatible with the initial purposes. Sensitive data in general and health data in particular 
enjoys much stricter protection and this clause shows that the stricter protection also applies 
to the compatibility of the further processing. The fourth factor stipulates that the possible 
consequences of the intended further processing for data subjects must be taken into account. 
The final factor requires to consider the existence of appropriate safeguards, which may 
include encryption or pseudonymisation. When combining the last two factors, it is possible 
that while using appropriate safeguards, the consequences for the data subject are not serious 
(the right to privacy is not breached). However, taking into account all factors above, the 
author concludes it is not possible that a further big data processing satisfies all the conditions 
and it could be considered as compatible further processing.   
 
3.3 Conclusion of the Chapter 
 
Due to health data’s high value, it would be beneficial if this data could be used for more 
purposes than the initial one for which it was collected. However, this could easily conflict 
with the data subject’s protection under the data protection rules. In the current chapter it was 
analysed whether it is possible to use the health data that has been collected in the mHealth 
apps for further processing without the consent of the data subject. Referring to the practices 
regarding big data, it can be concluded that such further use is not compliant with the rules of 
data protection, when the data subject has not given his/her consent.  
 
Although there is a debate about the general principles of data protection initiated by some 
advocates of big data, it has been concluded by the data protection authorities that these 
principles cannot be undermined and they were also reinforced in the GDPR. Therefore, in 
order to legitimise big data processing without the data subject’s consent, there must be 
special ground for it in the applicable law. The DPD and the GDPR allow further processing 
when it is carried out for scientific, historical or statistical purposes. While big data 
processing falls under the notion of statistical purposes and could be carried out when using 
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adequate safeguards, then the processing of health data adds even more conditions and 
requirements for using this exception. It stems from the Recital 53 and the Art 9 (2) (j) of the 
GDPR that this exception could be only used when there is public interest and by public 
institutions.  
 
Working Party brought out four factors in order to evaluate whether the further use of data 
would be compatible with the initial purpose and therefore would allow the processing. 
However, the evaluation of these factors showed that while processing health data, enjoying 
stricter rules than ‘regular’ personal data, it would not be possible to legitimise big data 
processing without the data subject’s consent or without completely anonymising the data. 
Therefore, the answer to the underlying question of this chapter is that the data subjects are 
protected from the further use of their personal data if they have not consented to it. However, 
as the further use of health data, especially while using the big data processing, has a potential 
of being beneficial to both the individuals and the whole society, a safe way of using this data 
should be promoted. For example, one possibility is anonymising the data, which, however, 
was not further discussed about as it was not the subject of the thesis.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The central question of this thesis was to determine whether the current EU data protection 
framework is sufficient in order to protect personal data in the field of mHealth. In addition, 
relevant changes to the framework were discussed in order to analyse whether there will be 
any changes in data protection in mHealth and whether they will strengthen the protection of 
personal data. 
 
In the process of answering the first sub-question, it was concluded that personal data is being 
processed in the course of data processing in mHealth. Although the apps and devices of 
mHealth are different, it was shown on the basis of an example data set which conditions 
should be taken into account in determining whether personal data is processed.  
 
Concerning health data, it was concluded that although the specific definition of health data 
was not included in the DPD, the content of the health data was in general same as it will be 
in the GDPR, because the notion of health data had been explained by courts and relevant 
data protection authorities.  
 
The author argued that by adding a wording ‘independent of its source’ to the definition of 
health data, the notion of health data is broadened, thus making it independent from the 
provision of healthcare services. This is relevant regarding mHealth, as many apps measure 
health parameters but are not provided by health care professionals. Therefore, as the 
definition of health data explicitly says that the source of the data is not relevant when 
determining its status of health, data subjects can count on stricter protection of these health 
data that have been collected in mHealth apps. 
 
The author of this thesis concluded that by adding the pseudonymisation tool to the GDPR, a 
better ground is established for the protection of personal data in mHealth. As the 
pseudonymisation of data does put a heavy burden on the data processors, but at the same 
time gives them several benefits, they are more likely willing to use the pseudonymisation 
tool. At the same time, individuals’ rights are better protected under the data protection 
principles as it is more complicated to relate certain data to a specific person. 
 
In addition, it was ascertained that regulations on medical devices also play a role in the 
protection of personal data. When an mHealth app or device is considered as a medical 
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device, specific requirements must be fulfilled to bring the product to the market which means 
that the compliance with the data protection rules will also be guaranteed. In addition, when a 
medical device is provided in the course of the provision of healthcare services, the consent of 
the data subject is not needed.  
 
While answering the second sub-question, it was established that the traditional data 
protection requirements shall still be applicable to mHealth. The requirement of consent as a 
basis for making data processing legitimate was described and relevant problems were 
brought out through an example. The consent for health data processing should be informed, 
freely given and explicit. It was found that in mHealth, the most problematic requirement is 
the requirement of informed consent as it is complicated to give the data subject all relevant 
information through an app. As the data collected are health data, the consent shall also be 
explicit and, after the adoption of the GDPR, also in a written form. These requirements fulfil 
the purpose of protecting the data subject from the breach of his right to privacy, because 
while consenting to the processing he/she shall have every possible opportunity to understand 
what kind of processing he/she is consenting to.  
  
The author reached a conclusion that while the application of traditional data protection 
principles as purpose limitation principle and data minimisation principle might be 
burdensome for the app developers, these principles are the most effective way to protect the 
users of an app from a situation in which their data could be harmed. In order to promote 
compliance with the principles and with the data protection requirement in general, a Code of 
Conduct for the app developers is being drafted, which the author finds to be a positive way to 
converge the data subjects’ rights and the interests of app developers. Therefore, it was 
concluded that the traditional data protection requirements analysed are in general a sufficient 
way to protect personal data.  
 
The final chapter analysed whether the health data collected in mHealth apps could possibly 
be used for further processing without the data subject’s consent. As health data carries an 
immense value, these data could be utilized for purposes other than that initially collected for. 
Nevertheless, such conduct might often breach the data protection regulations protecting the 
data subject. Deriving from ordinary practices regarding big data, it can be established that 
further use of this kind violates the data protection rules if the data subject has not given 
his/her consent.  
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Despite an existing debate on general principles of data protection between some advocates of 
big data, the data protection authorities have concluded that these principles cannot be 
undermined, and a similar approach has further been reinforced in the GDPR. Thus, to 
legitimise big data processing without the data subject’s consent, the applicable law must 
offer a special ground for this purpose.  
 
The DPD and the GDPR permit further processing when it is performed for scientific, 
historical or statistical purposes. In case big data processing is conducted for statistical 
purposes and could be carried out with using adequate safeguards, the processing of health 
data raises even further conditions and requirements for this exception to become available. 
According to Recital 53 and Art 9 (2) (j) of the GDPR, this exception could only be used 
upon the existence of public interest and by public institutions.  
 
Finally, it was brought out that there exists a possibility that even without the consent of the 
data subject, the further use might be compatible with initial purpose. Four factors brought out 
by the Working Party were examined and it was revealed that while processing health data, 
which already enjoys stricter rules than ‘regular’ personal data, legitimising big data 
processing without the data subject’s consent or without completely anonymising the data 
would not be possible. Importantly, it can thus be concluded that the data subjects are 
protected from further use of their personal data if they have not consented to it. Nevertheless, 
as further use of health data, including big data processing carries great potential to become 
beneficial to both individuals and the whole society, a safe method of using such data should 
be promoted. One possibility would be anonymising the data – a topic, which certainly 
deserves further research attention.  
 
Therefore, the answer to the thesis question must be answered that the current data protection 
rules are applicable to mHealth and they offer sufficient protection to personal data. It was 
concluded that some terms of personal data protection might be complicated to apply to the 
realities of mHealth or the traditional data protection principle might seem too burdensome 
for the use in mHealth. However, this does not mean they could not or should not be applied. 
In addition, the GDPR, which will enter into force in 2018, will not majorly amend the basic 
principles that should already now be taken into account in the field of mHealth, although it 
will offer some specification. 
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ANDMEKAITSE m-TERVISE VALDKONNAS. RESÜMEE 
 
Tänapäeva maailmas on nutiseadmete kasutamine muutunud igapäevaelu lahutamatuks osaks 
ning turul on tuhandeid tarkvararakendusi, mis seadmed nö targaks teevad. Spetsiaalsed 
tarkvararakendused ehk äpid töötavad peamiselt andmetega. Andmed võivad sinna sisestada 
äppide kasutajad või need võivad tuleneda ka spetsiaalsetest seadmetest, millega äpp 
ühendatud on. Teatud äppe kasutatakse tervise ja meditsiini eesmärgil. Tegemist võib olla 
lihtsa äpiga, kuhu kasutaja saab ise oma terviseandmed sisestada, kuid tänapäeval on levinud 
ka erinevad seadmed, mis suudavad sensorite abil inimese terviseandmeid ise jälgida ning 
neid analüüsida. Kõik sellised äpid moodustavad mobiilse tervise ehk m-tervise valdkonna. 
 
M-tervis võimaldab pakkuda tervishoiuteenuseid sõltumatu isiku ja arsti asukohast, kuid 
sellisel juhul on tegemist pigem telemeditsiini valdkonnaga, mida käesolev töö ei puuduta. 
Käesoleva töö fookuseks on andmed, mida m-tervise valdkonnas kogutakse ja töödeldakse. 
Kuigi suurel hulgal andmete kogumisel telefoni äppidesse on omad eelised, siis andmekaitse 
seisukohast võib selline tegevus pigem probleeme tekitada. Nimelt on äppides töödeldavate 
andmete näol üldjuhul tegemist isikuandmetega, tihtipeale ka terviseandmetega, mille 
töötlemise puhul tuleb kohaldada isikuandmete kaitse reegleid.  
 
Käesolev töö võtab aluseks Euroopa Liidu andmekaitseõiguse. Nimelt on isiku õigus 
privaatsusele ja tema isikuandmete kaitsele olnud juba pikka aega Euroopas tunnustatud. 
Alates 1996. aastast reguleerib andmekaitse valdkonda Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 
direktiiv 95/46/EÜ üksikisikute kaitse kohta isikuandmete töötlemisel ja selliste andmete vaba 
liikumise kohta (edaspidi Direktiiv) ning sellest on saanud rahvusvaheline standard 
andmekaitseõiguse alal. Tulenevalt tehnoloogia arengust ja ühe suureneva andmete mahuga 
on aga alates 2010. aastast toodud esile vajadus üle-Euroopalise andmekaitsereformi järele. 
Pärast pikaajalisi läbirääkimisi võttis Euroopa Parlament 14. aprillil 2016 vastu Euroopa 
Parlamendi ja Nõukogu Määruse füüsiliste isikute kaitse kohta isikuandmete töötlemisel ja 
selliste andmete vaba liikumise ning direktiivi 95/46/EÜ kehtetuks tunnistamise kohta 
(Isikuandmete kaitse üldmäärus) (edaspidi Määrus). Määruse sätteid hakatakse kohaldama 
2018. aastal. 
 
Käesoleva töö eesmärgiks on analüüsida praeguse ja tulevase Euroopa andmekaitseõiguse 
sobivust m-tervise valdkonnale. Nimelt on üha suurenevas andmete hulgas eriti oluline, et 
isikuandmed oleksid kaitstud, kuid juba 20 aastat tagasi vastu võetud Direktiiv ei pruugi 
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pakkuda piisavalt võimalusi ja kaitset sellise uue valdkonna nagu m-tervise jaoks. Töö 
hüpoteesiks on seatud, et Direktiivi sätted ei ole piisavad, et kaitsta isikuandmeid m-tervise 
valdkonnas ning ka uue Määruse tulemine ei muuda olukorda, sest Määruse muudatused ei 
ole piisavalt täpsed ja konkreetsed, et neid m-tervise valdkonnale kohaldada. Seega on töö 
keskseks uurimisküsimuseks, kas praegune ning tulevane Euroopa Liidu andmekaitse 
regulatsioon tagab piisava isikuandmete kaitse m-tervise valdkonnas. Küsimusele vastamiseks 
on töö jagatud kolme peatükki, mis omakorda on jagatud alapeatükkideks.  
 
Töö kirjutamisel on kasutatud nii hetkel kehtivat Direktiivi kui uut Määrust, et teha kindlaks, 
millised sätted m-tervisele kohalduvad ning millised on muutused Määruses. Õigusaktide 
sisustamisel on kasutatud suurel hulgal erinevate andmekaitseorganisatsioonide arvamusi. 
Kuigi m-tervise teemat ei ole veel akadeemiliselt väga palju uuritud, on siiski kasutatud 
mõningaid varasemaid töid.  
 
Esimene peatükk on pigem kirjeldava iseloomuga ning selle eesmärgiks on kaardistada 
andmekaitse mõisted, mis on m-tervise valdkonnas relevantsed ning nende kohaldamine m-
tervisele. Andmekaitse keskseks mõisteks on isikuandmed, sest nende töötlemine toob endaga 
kaasa andmekaitseõiguse kohaldamise. Isikuandmed on igasugune teave tuvastatud või 
tuvastatava füüsilise isiku kohta. Kuna isikuandmete mõiste on võrdlemisi lai, siis toimub 
nutiseadmetes olevates äppides pidev isikuandmete töötlemine, sest seadmete kasutajateks on 
füüsilised isikud, kes üldjuhul sisestavad sinna infot enda kohta.  
 
Isikuandmete eraldi kategooria moodustavad spetsiaalset kaitse vajavad isikuandmed, mille 
hulka kuuluvad ka terviseandmed. Kuna m-tervise valdkonnas töödeldakse suurel määral just 
tervisandmeid ning nendele on tagatud eriline kaitse, on oluline terviseandmete mõiste 
lahtiseletamine. Kuigi Direktiivis terviseandmete definitsiooni ei ole, siis kohtud on mitmel 
üksikjuhul analüüsinud, mida saab pidada terviseandmeteks. Tulenevalt aga interneti ning 
mobiilside levikust ei toimu enam terviseandmete vahetamine rangelt arsti ja patsiendi või 
näiteks töötaja ja tööandja vahel, vaid tervisandmed võivad liikuda andmesubjektilt mistahes 
töötlejale erinevaid viise pidi. Seega on vaja täpsemalt määratleda terviseandmete 
definitsioon. Määrus seda ka teeb, kuid töö autor jõudis järeldusele, et tegelikult ei sisalda 
siiski definitsioon midagi uut võrreldes varasema kohtupraktika ja autoriteetide arvamusega.  
 
M-tervise valdkonnas on probleemkohaks tervisandmete eristamine nö ’heaolu andmetest’. 
Selle all peetakse silmas andmeid, mis võivad küll kaudselt olla seotud inimese tervisliku 
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seisundiga, nt füüsiline aktiivsus, tarbitud kalorite arv, alkoholitarbimine, kuid mille puhul 
liiga väikse andmete hulgaga järeldusi ei saa teha. Direktiivi Artikkel 29 alusel loodud 
töögrupi (edaspidi Töögrupp) juhistest selgub, et üldjoontes on kolm liiki andmeid, mis just 
m-tervise valdkonnas kujutavad endast terviseandmeid: meditsiinilised andmed; nö toored 
andmed, mille puhul saab teha järeldusi inimese tervise kohta, kui neid kombineerida teiste 
andmetega; ning inimese tervise kohta juba tehtud järeldused.  
 
M-tervise äppide ja seadmete puhul on oluline analüüsida ka meditsiiniseadmete mõistet. 
Nimelt kui tegemist on meditsiiniseadmega 93/42/EMÜ direktiivi alusel, siis kohalduvad 
sellele spetsiaalsed reeglid, mille mõju ulatub ka andmekaitse valdkonda. Nimelt on sellisel 
juhul tegemist arsti-patsiendi suhtega ning terviseandmete töötlemiseks ei pea küsima eraldi 
nõusolekut. Samas on meditsiiniseadmete turule toomiseks spetsiifilised nõuded ning nende 
alla käivad ka andmekaitse põhimõtetega kooskõlas olemine.  
 
Teise peatüki eesmärk on vastata küsimusele, kas andmekaitseõiguse peamised nõuded ja 
printsiibid on sobivad m-tervises kasutamiseks ning kas nende kohaldamine on võimalik. 
Isikuandmete töötlemisel peab olema töötlemiseks üks kuuest Direktiivi Art 7 toodud alusest. 
Esimene ja kõige eelistatum nendest alustest on andmesubjekti nõusolek andmete 
töötlemiseks. Nõusolekule kohalduvad aga teatud tingimused. Nimelt peab nõusolek olema 
vabatahtlik, konkreetne ja teadlik tahteavaldus. M-tervise valdkonnas pole tavaliselt 
probleeme vabatahtlikkuse kriteeriumiga, kuid teised kaks kriteeriumi võivad neid tekitada. 
Nimelt tähendab konkreetsuse kriteerium seda, et andmesubjekt saab anda kehtiva nõusoleku 
ainult sellisel juhul, kui nõusolek käib piiratud andmete kohta piiratud ajal ning teada on 
andmete töötlemise eesmärk. Selliste piirangute seadmine ei pruugi aga kasulik olla äpi 
arendajale, sest ta ei saa kogutud andmeid hiljem kasutada, mis võib talle väga kasulikuks 
osutuda.  
 
Probleemne on ka informeerituse kriteerium, sest väikse m-tervise seadme kaudu on keeruline 
edasi anda kogu vajalikku infot töötlemise kohta. Kuigi Töögrupp on välja pakkunud nö 
kihilise nõusoleku vormi (nõusolekut küsitakse ühel äpi lehel ning enne selle andmist on 
võimalik tutvuda tingimustega eraldi keskkonnas või veebiaadressil), siis töö autori hinnangul 
vähendab see nõusoleku väärtust, sest ühel hetkel hakkavad inimesed andma nõusolekut ilma 
tegelikult süvenemata, millele nad nõusoleku annavad.  
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Tervisandmete töötlemisel peab tulenevalt Direktiivi Art 8 (2) (a) nõusolek lisaks olema 
selgesõnaline ning tulenevalt Määruse Art 7 (1) taas esitataval kujul. Sellised nõuded aitavad 
paremini tagada terviseandmete kaitse.  
 
Teise peatüki teine osa tegeleb andmekaitse printsiipidega. Nimelt peab kogu isikuandmete 
töötlemine olema kooskõlas Direktiivi Art 6 (1) printsiipidega. Käesolevas töös on 
analüüsimiseks valitud andmete minimaalsuse printsiip ja eesmärgipärasuse printsiip, sest just 
need printsiibid on ühest küljest kõige olulisema isikuandmete kaitse tagamisel, kuid teisalt 
tekitavad probleeme m-tervise valdkonnas kohaldamisel.  
 
Andmete minimaalsuse printsiip tähendab seda, et andmeid ei või koguda liigsetes kogustes, 
nt tuleviku tarbeks igaks juhuks. Kui andmete töötlemise eesmärk on lõppenud, tuleb andmed 
isikule tagastada. M-tervise valdkonnas tähendab see, et kuigi andmetöötlejal oleks väga 
kasulik hoida enda valduses kõiki andmeid, mis ta on isikutelt saanud, et neid edasi töödelda 
muude eesmärkide saavutamiseks, siis tegelikult ta seda teha ei tohi.  
 
Eesmärgipärasuse printsiibi kohaselt peab iga andmetöötlus lähtuma mingist konkreetsest 
eesmärgist ning selles piiridest ei või väljuda. M-tervise seisukohast tähendab see, et äpi looja 
ei või muuta äpis kasutatavate isikuandmete töötlemise eesmärki ilma selleks enne 
andmesubjektilt nõusolekut küsimata.  
 
Töö kolmas osa keskendub andmete hilisemale töötlemisele. Nimelt on teatud juhtudel 
võimalik töödelda isikuandmeid pärast esimese töötlemise lõppu ilma selleks isikult 
nõusolekut küsimata. Töö autor leiab, et kui selline võimalus rakendub ka big data ehk 
suurandmete töötlemisprotsessile, siis võib see olulisel määral kahjustada isikute 
privaatsusele.  
 
Nimelt on suurandmete töötlemise puhul võimalik jõuda järeldusteni, mis võivad kahjustada 
isikut (profileerimine) või võivad läbi suurandmete töötlemise lekkida isikuandmed 
kolmandate osapoolte kätte. Üheks võimalikuks aluseks, et suurandmete töötlemine oleks 
seaduspärane on Direktiivi Art 6 (1) (b), mis lubab isikuandmete hilisema töötlemise juhul, 
kui see viiakse läbi ajaloo, statistika või teadusega seotud eesmärkidel. Kuigi Töögrupp on 
paigutanud suurandmete töötlemise statistika valdkonda, siis tervisandmete sellisel viisil 
töötlemine pole siiski lubatud.  
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Lisaks on Töögrupp avaldanud arvamust, et isegi kui tegemist pole ajaloo, statistika või 
teadusega seotud eesmärkidel töötlemisega, siis ei saa välistada, et hilisem töötlemine on 
siiski kooskõlas esialgse töötlemise eesmärkidega. Ka siin on välja toodud kriteeriumid, mille 
alusel kooskõla hinnata. Üks kriteeriumitest ütleb, et hinnata tuleb isikuandmete liiki ning 
fakt, et töödelda tahetakse terviseandmeid on töö autori hinnangul piisav alus sellise 
töötlemise mitte lubamiseks ilma andmesubjekti nõusolekuta.  
 
Töö lõpuks jõuab autor vastupidisele seisukohale sissejuhatuses püstitatust ning lükkab 
hüpoteesi ümber. Nimelt selgub vastavatele uurimisküsimustele vastates, et kuigi m-tervise 
valdkond toob oma uudsusega kaasa mõningaid raskusi andmekaitseõiguse kohaldamisel, on 
tegelikult kõik peamised andmekaitse printsiibid ja nõuded sobivad ka selleks, et tagada m-
tervises isikuandmete piisav kaitse.  
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